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Companionship, emotional support, assistance for disabled family mem-
bers, and general health benefits are just a few examples of why people
choose to keep pets in their homes. This article explores the major legal is-
sues that arise when people desire to keep companion animals in various
types of housing. The Author examines the effects of federal, state, and local
laws, as well as common contract clauses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sixty-two percent of households in the United States include a
pet.1 Owners of pets say that the most significant benefits of having an
animal in their lives include companionship, love, company, and affec-
tion.2 Many pet owners consider their animals to be family members.3
Pet owners report that they believe pets relieve stress and are
good for their health and the health of other human family members.4
This belief is supported by an increasing number of studies that have
considered the impact of companion animals on human health.5 For
example, research shows that physical contact with companion ani-
mals has a calming effect on people.6 Several studies have shown that
interacting with companion animals decreases people’s blood pres-
1 Am. Pet Prods. Mfrs. Assn., Inc. (APPMA), 2003–2004 APPMA National Pet Own-
ers Survey xvi (2003) (reporting data from 2002). The pets that the APPMA includes in
this statistic include dogs, cats, birds, fish, and other small animals. Id. Pet ownership
increased in fifty-four percent of all households in 1988 and has stayed stable from the
last survey reporting data from 2000. Id.
2 Id. at xxxiv (reporting what owners of dogs, cats, birds, and small animals list as
benefits of pet ownership). An increasing number of persons with companion animals in
their lives consider themselves their animals’ “guardian” rather than “owner.” Rebecca
J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planing Issues Relating to Companion Ani-
mals, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 181, 197–200 (2003) [hereinafter Huss, Separation] (discuss-
ing the increasing use of the term guardian and the adoption of statutory language in
state and city codes that reflect this change). Notwithstanding the increasing use of this
new terminology, this article will utilize the term “owner” to reflect the legal status of
these animals as personal property. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best
Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 47, 68–87
(2002) [hereinafter Huss, Valuation] (discussing the legal status of animals as personal
property).
3 Am. Veterinary Med. Assn. (AVMA), U.S. Pet Ownership & Demographics
Sourcebook 12, 16 (2002) (reporting that 51% of dog owners and 46.1% of cat owners
consider their pets family members). The percentage of owners that consider their pets
family members decreases with the age of the respondent. Id.; see also Am. Pet Prods.
Mfrs. Assn., Inc., supra n. 1, at xxxiv (reporting that seventy percent of dog owners and
sixty-two percent of cat owners consider their animals to be like a child or family
member).
4 Am. Pet Prods. Mfrs. Assn., Inc. (APPMA), supra n. 1, at xxxiv (reporting that
sixty-three percent of dog owners and sixty-five percent of cat owners say that a benefit
of ownership is relaxation and stress relief, and that fifty-eight percent of dog owners
and thirty-nine percent of cat owners report that they believe the animals are “good for
my health or my family’s health”).
5 See generally Companion Animals in Human Health (Cindy C. Wilson & Dennis
C. Turner eds., Sage Publications 1998) (discussing a variety of studies done on the
impact of companion animals on human health); Delta Society, Health Benefits of Ani-
mals Bibliography, http://www.deltasociety.org/dsc040.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005)
(listing articles that report on studies finding companion animals affect human health
in a positive way); Delta Society, Healthy Reasons to Have a Pet, http://www.
deltasociety.org/dsc020.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (listing the results of studies that
found various ways that companion animals improved the health of humans).
6 Aaron H. Katcher, How Companion Animals Make Us Feel, in Perceptions of Ani-
mals in American Culture 113, 120 (R.J. Hoage ed., Smithsonian Press 1989) (discuss-
ing how visual and physical contact with animals induces calm).
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sure.7 Another study found that people with companion animals had
lower cholesterol and triglycerides.8 Companion animals are now be-
ing used to treat some types of mental illness.9
A growing number of people claim that their companion animals
act as “emotional support” animals.10 Unlike traditional service ani-
mals that are used to perform a physical task, the interaction with and
presence of emotional support animals alone is thought to have psy-
chological benefits. One recent study supporting this theory focused on
the impact of pet ownership on depression in individuals at risk for
AIDS.11 The conclusion of the study was that “pets have a salutary
effect on the mental health of men with AIDS.”12 Even in persons with-
out a specific psychiatric problem, studies have shown that there are
important mental and emotional benefits from pet ownership for
adults.13
In addition, a significant number of pet owners believe that pets
are good for children or teach children responsibility.14 Studies focus-
ing on the impact of having companion animals in the lives of chil-
dren15 show that pet ownership “provides long-term mental and
emotional benefits for children and adolescents.”16
7 Id. at 123 (reporting human physiological changes during interactions with pets).
8 Alan M. Beck & Aaron H. Katcher, Between Pets and People: The Importance of
Animal Companionship 7 (Purdue U. Press 1996).
9 Elizabeth Blandon, Reasonable Accommodation or Nuisance? Service Animals for
the Disabled, 75-Mar Fla. B.J. 12 (2001). Although the use of service dogs to assist per-
sons with physical disabilities is well known, recently the use of animals to assist per-
sons with mental disorders such as depression, panic disorder, and bi-polar disorder has
generated attention. Id. at 14; see also Gail F. Melson, Why the Wild Things Are: Ani-
mals in the Lives of Children 99–131 (Harvard U. Press 2001) (discussing the use of
animals in therapy with children); Tufts University School of Veterinary Medicine,
Animal Facilitated Therapy, http://www.tufts.edu/vet/cfa/aft_bib.html (updated August
21, 1999) (listing journal and magazine articles discussing animal assisted therapy).
10 See infra nn. 104–07 and accompanying text (discussing the role of emotional sup-
port animals).
11 J.M. Siegel et al., AIDS Diagnosis and Depression in the Multicenter AIDS Cohort
Study: The Ameliorating Impact of Pet Ownership, 11 AIDS Care 157, 159 (1999). This
research utilized the participants of an existing study that was established to study the
natural history of AIDS and was limited to homosexual and bisexual men. Id. This
study found that the most “significant impact of pet ownership was among men with
high levels of attachment to their pets and low levels of confidant support.” Id. at
166–67.
12 Id. at 167. The analysis of this study did not support a direct effect of pet owner-
ship on depression. Id. at 166.
13 Lynette A. Hart & Aline H. Kidd, Potential Pet Ownership in U.S. Rental Hous-
ing, 19 Canine Practice 24, 25 (1994).
14 Am. Pet Prods. Mfrs. Assn., Inc. (APPMA), supra n. 1, at xxxiv (stating that
thirty-eight percent of dog owners and twenty-eight percent of cat owners report that a
benefit of pet ownership is that they are good for children or teach them responsibility).
15 See generally Melson, supra n. 9 (discussing the relationship between animals
and children and the impact of contact with animals on children). Cf. Am. Pet Prods.
Mfrs. Assn., Inc. (APPMA), supra n. 1, at xxxvi (stating that “[p]et owners are more
likely to have children living at home than the U.S. population at large”).
16 Hart & Kidd, supra n. 13, at 25.
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Given the benefits of interacting with companion animals to such
a significant portion of the U.S. population, it is important for the legal
system to facilitate responsible pet ownership. This article will address
the major legal issues that arise when people desire to keep companion
animals in their homes. The article first examines the federal laws
that may provide for a right to have a companion animal in the
home.17 Next, the article considers the impact of common clauses that
restrict or prohibit pets in rental housing and condominiums. Finally,
the article analyzes issues that all residents must consider when har-
boring a companion animal on their property.
II. FEDERAL LAWS
Animals are treated as personal property under U.S. law.18 It is a
long-standing tradition in the common law that people have a legal
right to own and control property.19 Generally, the common law sup-
ports the idea of “absolute” possession of property, although there may
be some restrictions on the use of personal property.20 If an animal is
considered a companion animal, a person may have more rights in the
animal but will also likely be subject to more statutory
responsibilities.21
Absent an applicable statute, landlords may restrict or prohibit
the harboring of an animal in a rental unit.22 In addition, local laws
may restrict the number or type of animal to be held on the property or
impose other requirements relating to the ownership of the animal
even if a person owns the real property where the animal is located.23
Federal law may preempt these restrictions.24 The federal laws di-
rectly impacting one’s ability to keep a companion animal in housing
all relate to specific classes of people or housing. The first law analyzed
17 This article discusses the federal laws applicable to companion animals in hous-
ing. Some states have laws that contain similar provisions, and examples of these laws
will be referenced in the footnotes when applicable.
18 See generally Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Temple U.
Press 1995) (discussing the treatment of animals as property in the law); Orland A.
Soave, Animals, the Law and Veterinary Medicine 159 (4th ed. Rowman & Littlefield
2000) (noting the first U.S. judicial decision, in 1871, recognizing a property right in
dogs); see also Huss, Valuation, supra n. 2, at 69–89 (discussing the current legal status
of animals).
19 Francione, supra n. 18, at 38.
20 Id. at 41.
21 James F. Wilson, Law and Ethics of the Veterinary Profession 74 (Priority Press,
Ltd. 1988) (describing the statutory responsibilities that may arise out of local, state, or
federal law). These responsibilities will be discussed in more detail in part IV infra.
22 See infra nn. 241–48 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions in lease
agreements).
23 See infra pt.  IV (discussing local laws).
24 Prior to 1988 other laws were used to support having a service animal in housing.
See e.g. Ocean Gate Assocs. Starrett Sys., Inc. v. Dopico, 441 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (Civ. Ct.,
N.Y.C., Kings County 1981) (citing to various laws in New York that precluded a sum-
mary judgment in a case where a landlord wanted to terminate a lease due to the dis-
abled tenants’ violation of a no-pet clause where the dog served in a security function).
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in this article is the Fair Housing Act (FHA).25 The FHA can require
that service animals for the disabled be allowed to stay in housing de-
spite no-pets clauses.26
A. Fair Housing Act (FHA)
1. Applicability to Disabled Persons and Service Animals
The FHA was originally passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.27 It provided protection from discrimination in housing on the
basis of race, color, national origin, or gender.28 In 1988 the Fair Hous-
ing Act Amendments were passed, expanding the FHA to included
handicapped persons in those classes protected from housing discrimi-
nation.29 Handicap is defined, with respect to a person, as “(1) a physi-
cal or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having such an im-
pairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.”30
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is re-
sponsible for the administration of the FHA.31 The Attorney General
or private persons may enforce the FHA.32 Relief for private plaintiffs
may include actual and punitive damages, injunctions, and attorney
fees at the discretion of the court.33
Although many of the cases discussing the applicability of the
FHA deal with multi-family dwellings, single-family homes also fall
under the purview of the statute.34 The sale or rental of a single-family
home by an owner is exempt from the FHA; however, this exemption
will not apply if the private individual owner owns more than three
such single-family homes.35 Similarly, use of a real estate agent or bro-
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2000). In this article, references to the FHA include the
FHA as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.
26 See infra n. 40 and accompanying text (explaining that waiver of a no-pet rule to
allow for a service animal may be required as a reasonable accommodation under the
FHA); nn. 52–70 and accompanying text (discussing cases where waiver of no-pets rules
required).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.; see also H.R. Rpt. 100-711 at 14 (June 17, 1988) (re-
printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176) (available at 1988 WL 169871 at *15) (dis-
cussing the background and need for the Fair Housing Act).
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.
29 Id. See also H.R. Rpt. 100-711 at 17 (June 17, 1988) (reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (available at 1988 WL 169871 at *18)) (discussing the need for
an amendment to the Fair Housing Act to protect handicapped individuals).
30 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). The term handicap does not include “the current, illegal use
of or addiction to a controlled substance.” Id. This article will use the terms “handicap”
and “disability” interchangeably as many of the court decisions do in this area. See e.g.
Helen L. v. Didario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995) (using both terms throughout).
31 42 U.S.C. § 3608. Note that this is the same department that administers the two
other federal statutes discussed herein.
32 Id. at §§ 3613–14.
33 Id. at §§ 3612–13.
34 Id. at § 3603(b)(1).
35 Id.
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ker to rent out the home also destroys the exemption for the private
individual owner.36
A plaintiff may prove discrimination under the FHA by showing
the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.37 Specifically, the
FHA definition of housing discrimination includes refusing to make
“reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”38 Note that, although
the FHA requires that the public and common use portions of multi-
family dwellings constructed after January 1, 1991 be handicapped ac-
cessible, any reasonable modifications within the unit are at the ex-
pense of the disabled person.39
Examples in federal regulations40 and case law41 have made it
clear that a reasonable accommodation may include a waiver of a no-
pets rule to allow for a service animal. It is not uncommon for a lawsuit
alleging violation of the FHA to also include claims based on the fed-
eral Rehabilitation Act42 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).43
2. Nexus between the Animal and the Disability
To establish a valid claim under federal law, it is necessary to es-
tablish a nexus between the animal and the disability.44 In Nason v.
Stone Hill Realty Association, a disabled tenant took in her mother’s
cat after her mother died. The manager of the apartment told her to
remove the cat.45 Nason, who had multiple sclerosis, submitted a let-
ter from physician that “suggested that there would be serious nega-
tive consequences for her health if she was compelled to remove the
cat.”46 The court found that Nason did not show “a substantial likeli-
hood that maintaining possession of the cat [was] necessary due to her
handicap.”47 Specifically, although the affidavit provided by Nason’s
36 Id.
37 See Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1995) (deaf tenants claimed
discrimination when landlord refused to permit them to keep a dog as a reasonable
accommodation).
38 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
39 Id. at § 3604(f)(3)(A). This is in contrast to the Americans with Disabilities Act
provision that requires the person with the public accommodation to pay for any reason-
able accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)–(10)(B) (2000).
40 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b) (2003).
41 See infra pts. II (A)(3)–(A)(5) (cases discussing waivers of no-pets rules).
42 29 U.S.C. §§ 791–94 (2000). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that agencies
and organizations that receive federal funds or contracts (in excess of certain dollar
amounts) may not discriminate against qualified individuals with disabilities. Id.
§ 794(a)–(c).
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2000).
44 Nason v. Stone Hill Realty Assn., 1996 WL 1186942 at *1 (Mass. Super. May 6,
1996).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at *3.
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doctor indicated that removal of the cat would result in “increased
symptoms of depression, weakness, spasticity and fatigue,” it “[did] not
demonstrate that such symptoms [were] treatable solely by maintain-
ing the cat or whether another more reasonable accommodation [was]
available to address Nason’s symptoms.”48 The court continued by
stating that the affidavit failed to “illustrate how the presence of the
cat, as opposed to some other therapeutic method such as chemical
therapy, [was] essential or necessary to treating her symptoms.”49
Thus, the motion for a preliminary injunction was denied because the
court found that the record “[failed] to clearly demonstrate the nexus
between keeping the cat and her handicap . . . .”50
3. Status of Animal is Key to the Analysis
Another issue that has been the subject of case law is determining
when an animal should be considered a service animal, as opposed to a
companion animal whose owner may be prohibited from keeping the
animal on the property. The only requirements in the federal regula-
tions for classification as a service animal are that the animal  (1) be
individually trained, and (2) work for the benefit of a disabled individ-
ual.51 There is no specific requirement as to the amount or type of
training a service animal must undergo. There are also no require-
ments as to the amount or type of work a service animal must provide
for a disabled person.
An often cited case discussing these issues is the Seventh Circuit
case of Bronk v. Ineichen.52 In Bronk, deaf tenants alleged that a land-
lord had discriminated against them in violation of the FHA by refus-
ing to allow them to keep a dog in a rented townhouse.53 The Bronk
court found that “a deaf individual’s need for the accommodation af-
forded by a hearing dog is . . . per se reasonable within the meaning of
the statute.”54 The court found that in this case, the skill level of the
dog (i.e. whether the dog was really a hearing dog) was in dispute.55
The Bronk court set out two standards that a disabled person
must meet in arguing that an accommodation must be made.56 First,
“the accommodation”—in this case, waiver of a no-pets clause—“must
facilitate a disabled individual’s ability to function.”57 To determine
whether the standard is met, it is possible to look in part at whether
the animal has met any professional credentials; essentially, the level
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Nason, 1996 WL 1186942 at *1.
51 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2003).
52 54 F.3d 425.
53 Id. at 426–27.
54 Id. at 429 (italics in original).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 431.
57 Id.
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of schooling of the animal.58 However, the court specifically stated that
the federal statute does not require professional training.59
The second standard set forth in Bronk was that “[the accommo-
dation] must survive a cost-benefit balancing test that takes both par-
ties’ needs into account.”60 The court reiterated the findings of cases
discussing reasonable accommodation under the ADA and stated that
“reasonable accommodation does not entail an obligation to do every-
thing humanly possible to accommodate a disabled person; cost (to the
defendant) and benefit (to the plaintiff) merit consideration as well.”61
In addition, a “nexus” requirement was included in the court’s analy-
sis: “the concept of necessity requires at a minimum the showing that
the desired accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled
plaintiff’s quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disability.”62
After setting forth the standards for determining whether an accom-
modation is reasonable, the Bronk court found that a new trial was
necessary due to jury instructions that may have confused jury
members.63
A subsequent hearing-aide dog case that cited Bronk was Green v.
Housing Authority of Clackamas County.64 The Green court reviewed
federal law and, citing to Bronk, found that there was no federal certi-
fication process and that there were no requirements for service ani-
mals.65 It determined that the Housing Authority’s “requirement that
an assistance animal be trained by a certified trainer of assistance ani-
mals, or at least by a highly skilled individual, has no basis in law or
fact.”66 As to the cost-benefit balancing analysis, Congressional intent
supported a finding that, as a recipient of federal funds, the “only way
a defendant can avoid modifying its ‘no-pets’ policy is if the animal
fundamentally alters the nature of the program or if the defendant suf-
fers undue financial and administrative burdens.”67 The defendant in
this case admitted that waiving the no-pets policy did not “cause either
a fundamental alteration to its programs or cause any financial or ad-
ministrative burdens.”68 In addition, the housing authority could not
impose any policy that limits the participation of a handicapped ten-
ant, such as requiring “certification or third-party verification of the
58 Bronk, 54 F.3d at 431.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 429 (citing U.S. v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994)
and Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995)).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 431.
64 994 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (D. Or. 1998).
65 Id. at 1255–56.
66 Id. at 1256.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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assistance animal’s abilities.”69 The plaintiff tenant’s summary judg-
ment motion was granted as the court found that the housing author-
ity did not accommodate plaintiffs by modifying its no-pets policy.70
In contrast, a West Virginia court found that some type of certifi-
cation process requirement for a service animal may be allowed under
federal law.71 In In re Kenna Homes Cooperative Corp., the owners of
cooperative units were allowed to have pets in their units for many
years.72 In 1996 the stockholders voted to request that the board of
directors enact a rule phasing out animals on the property.73 The Jes-
sups’ small dog had died after the rule was enacted, and they obtained
two new dogs.74 The Jessups had various medical problems, including
arthritis, depression, and problems with blood pressure.75 They
presented evidence of these problems when they applied for permission
to keep the newly acquired dogs in their apartment, arguing that a
waiver of the no-pets policy would be a reasonable accommodation for
their disabilities.76 The board of directors rejected the request and
filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment in the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County to determine whether the pet rule was in compliance
with the applicable law.77 The cooperative corporation’s rule had an
exception for trained dogs as follows:
There is excepted, however, seeing-eye and hearing-aide dogs or any other
trained dog, provided the animal is properly trained and certified for the
particular disability, licensed and provided further that the stockholder or
resident has a certificate or authorization request from a licensed physician
specializing in the field of subject disability.78
The Circuit Court of Kanawha County found that the rule was “in
compliance with both federal and state law” and reasoned that there
was no correlation between the dogs and the claimed disabilities.79
69 Green, 994 F. Supp. at 1256. But see infra nn. 71–90 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing In re Kenna Homes Coop. Corp., which allows for some type of certification
requirement).
70 Green, 994 F. Supp. at 1257. In addition, the Green court found that an Oregon
state law requiring that a hearing ear dog be kept on an orange leash was preempted by
federal law. Id.
71 In re Kenna Homes Coop. Corp., 557 S.E.2d 787 (W. Va. 2001).
72 Id. at 791. See infra n. 268 (defining “cooperative corporation”).
73 Id. at 791–92.
74 Id. at 792.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 792. One of the physicians’ statements indicated “it is a medical necessity
for [the Jessups] with their present health ailments to be able to keep their pets to
suppress both the physical and mental need for companionship as well as the confine-
ment due to the various illnesses.” In re Kenna, 557 S.E.2d at 792.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. Further, the circuit court found that that the “necessity” for these dogs was not
related to any specific disability, and that there was no offering that the two dogs were a
necessary reasonable accommodation. Id.
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The appellate court in Kenna found that the rule was valid, in
part.80 Specifically, it stated that “a requirement that a service dog be
‘properly trained’ does not conflict with federal or state law.”81 As to
the certification requirement, unless such requirement was applied in
a flexible manner, it would violate the FHA.82 Guidelines were set
forth to govern the issue of certification.83 Specifically, a landlord could
require a tenant seeking to keep an animal under the FHA to:
demonstrate that he or she made a bona fide effort to locate a certifying
authority and, if such authority is located, to subject the service animal to
the specialized training necessary for such certification . . . . If neither the
tenant nor the landlord . . . can locate a certifying authority after reasona-
ble attempts to do so, it is reasonable for the landlord . . . to require that a
recognized training facility or person certify that the service animal has
that degree of training and temperament which would enable the service
animal to ameliorate the effects of its [owner‘s] disability and to live in its
owner’s household without disturbing the peace of mind of a person of ordi-
nary sensibilities regarding animals.84
The Kenna court emphasized that certification was just a formal
assertion, in writing, of some fact, but clearly stated that “the burden
is on the person claiming the need for a service animal as a reasonable
accommodation to show that his or her animal is properly trained.”85
Emphasis was also placed on the fact that the service animal must be a
reasonable accommodation.86 Thus, an animal can be excluded if it is a
nuisance, and the tenant can be held to sanitary conditions and may be
responsible for any damage caused by the service animal.87 The court
also found that it was reasonable for a landlord, in situations “where a
tenant suffers from a disability which is not apparent to a person un-
trained in medical matters . . . to require a second concurring opinion
from a qualified physician selected by the landlord . . . to substantiate
the tenant’s need for a service animal.”88 Holding that the rule, as it
applied to the Jessups, did not violate the FHA or the West Virginia
Fair Housing Act,89 the court found that “[palliative] care and the ordi-
nary comfort of a pet are not sufficient to justify a request for a service
animal . . . .”90
80 Id. at 797.
81 In re Kenna, 557 S.E.2d at 797. The court focused on federal regulations and other
case law that found that a requirement of a service animal is that it be “individually
trained.” Id.
82 Id. The court did consider the fact that there are no uniform standards or creden-
tialing criteria for service animals. Id.
83 Id. at 798.
84 Id.
85 In re Kenna, 557 S.E.2d at 798.
86 Id. at 799.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 800.
90 Id. (footnote omitted). The court did recognize that some chronic and severe
psychoses may support the need for an animal as an accommodation. Id. at 800 n. 15.
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Kenna is an example of the outer limits of case law relating to
requirements that may be placed upon a disabled person in requesting
a reasonable accommodation in connection with allowing a service
animal in housing. Although Kenna provides an apparently rational
interpretation of the FHA, it is important to note that this was a state
court interpreting a federal law.91
The requirement that an animal be individually trained was sup-
ported by a subsequent federal district court case.92 In Prindable v.
Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, the court empha-
sized that, where the primary handicap was mental and emotional in
nature, an “animal . . . must be peculiarly suited to ameliorate the
unique problems of the mentally disabled.”93 The Prindable court re-
jected the suggestion of plaintiff’s counsel that “canines (as a species)
possess the ability to give unconditional love, which simply makes peo-
ple feel better,”94 and stated that allowing this “reasoning permits no
identifiable stopping point,” and would change the test “from ‘individu-
ally trained to do work or perform tasks’ to ‘of some comfort.’”95 Noth-
ing was found in the record to lead a reasonable jury to conclude that
the dog at issue was an individually trained service animal.96 The
Prindable court agreed with the Kenna court that landlords may in-
quire into and verify an asserted handicap or the necessity of a re-
quested accommodation.97
Notwithstanding the holdings in Kenna and Prindable, earlier
cases make it clear that no distinction should be made between physi-
cal and mental disabilities.98 In Crossroads Apartment Associates v.
91 557 S.E.2d 787 at 790.
92 Prindable v. Assn. of Apt. Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1256
(D. Haw. 2003).
93 Id. at 1256 (citation omitted).
94 Id. at 1257 n. 25.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1256. The court granted the defendants a judgment as a matter of law as to
plaintiff’s claims under the FHA for failure to make a reasonable accommodation. Id. at
1262.
97 Prindable, 304 F. Supp. 2d. at 1260. See also Timberlane Mobile Home Park
v.Wash. St. Human Rights Commn., 95 P.3d 1288, 1291 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2004) (hold-
ing that a dog was not a service animal when it had not received training for the pur-
pose of assisting or accommodating a disabled person).
98 E.g. Majors v. Hous. Auth. of the County of DeKalb Ga., 652 F.2d 454, 456 (5th Cir.
1981) (Although this case is based on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, it is often cited
when courts discuss waiver of a no-pet rule as a reasonable accomodation due to a
mental disability. E.g. Woodside Village v. Hertzmark, 1993 WL 268293 at *5; Auburn
Woods I Homeowners Assn. v. Fair Empl. & Housing Commn., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 669,
680.); Hous. Auth. of the City of New London v. Tarrant, 1997 WL 30320 at *1 (Conn.
Super. Jan. 14, 1997) (wherein the court noted that “given an appropriate factual predi-
cate, mental handicap may warrant reasonable accommodations, including the keeping
of an animal in a public housing complex,” but found that the factual predicate was
missing in this case. Id. at *2); Whittier Terrace Assocs. v. Hampshire, 532 N.E.2d 712
(Mass. App. 1989) (summary process action, also based on the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, wherein the tenant’s psychiatric disability, and claimed emotional and psychiatric
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LeBoo,99 summary judgment was precluded on the issue of whether
keeping a cat was necessary to assist a tenant in coping with a mental
illness, specifically panic disorder with agoraphobia, mixed personality
disorder, as well as chronic anxiety with a history of episodic alcohol
abuse. The court stated, utilizing both the Rehabilitation Act and the
FHA, that the plaintiff “must demonstrate that he has an emotional
and psychological dependence on the cat which requires him to keep
the cat in the apartment.”100
In Janush v. Charities Housing Development Corp., another case
finding that summary judgment was inappropriate, the focus was on
the effect of pets on a mental disability.101 A genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether it was a reasonable accommodation to allow
a mentally disabled tenant to keep two cats and two birds in violation
of a no-pets policy.102 Testimony in this case established that the pets
lessened the effects of the tenant’s disability by providing her compan-
ionship, and that the pets were necessary to her mental health.103
Although these cases dealt with persons with serious mental disa-
bilities, a growing number of disputes are arising over so-called “emo-
tional support animals.”104 One attorney’s experience with these cases
is that once a state human rights commission or HUD has established
probable cause supporting a tenant, the landlord frequently drops the
assertion of a no-pets clause.105 Another attorney’s experience is that a
letter explaining in detail the law and the rights of the tenant to have
an emotional support animal, along with substantive documentation
from a medical professional, is usually sufficient to persuade a land-
lord to allow an emotional support animal to remain in a unit notwith-
standing a standard no-pets clause.106 One argument that is made by
dependency on the cat, called for a “narrow exception to the rigid application of the no-
pet rule.” Id. at 713.).
99 578 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (City Ct. of N.Y., Rochester 1991).
100 Id. at 1005, 1007. In addition, a determination of whether a reasonable accommo-
dation could be made was an issue in this case. Due to conflicting testimony, summary
judgment was denied. Id. at 1007.
101 169 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
102 Id. at 1134–36.
103 Id. at 1134.
104 Telephone Interview with Maddy Tarnofsky, Attorney (Jan. 28, 2004) (Ms.
Tarnofsky practices in New York and has seen a growing number of cases involving
emotional support animals); telephone Interview with Sharon Cregeen, Member of
O’Donnell, McDonald & Cregeen, L.L.C. (Jan. 29, 2004) (Ms. Cregeen practices in Con-
necticut and has represented tenants with cancer, AIDS, and depression that have re-
quested waivers of no-pets policies to allow for emotional support animals. She also
reports having seen an increasing number of cases involving emotional support animals
over the last few years); see also Motoko Rich, Pet Therapy Sets Landlords Howling, N.
Y. Times F1 (June 26, 2003) (discussing cases of emotional support animals).
105 Telephone Interview with Maddy Tarnofsky, supra n. 104.
106 Telephone Interview with Sharon Cregeen, supra n. 104 (Ms. Cregeen finds that
the biggest issue is educating landlords and tenants about the rights of tenants to keep
an animal under the FHA); but see Landmark Props. v. Olivo, 2004 WL 1587447, at *2
(N.Y. App. Term July 6, 2004) (holding that a tenant failed to introduce sufficient evi-
dence to establish his handicap, and to establish the necessity of keeping a dog to use
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tenants’ attorneys is that the “only requirements for an emotional sup-
port animal are that it be well-socialized and able to accompany [the
tenant] to public places.”107
If the standards set by Kenna, and adopted by Prindable, are sup-
ported by subsequent decisions interpreting the FHA, persons assert-
ing their rights under the FHA will need to establish a clear record of
their disabilities, as well as the status of the animal, to have a service
animal in housing where a no-pets policy applies. Based on findings in
Prindable, establishing the status of an animal as a service animal
will be especially difficult in situations involving emotionally or men-
tally disabled individuals.108 The courts in these cases ignore the stud-
ies that show a direct benefit to individuals, specifically those with
these types of disorders that are ameliorated due to the companionship
of an animal.109 In addition, these recent cases appear to ignore earlier
cases involving mentally and emotionally disabled tenants that set
forth standards (that precluded summary judgment) focusing on
whether there was emotional or physical dependence on an animal,110
or whether an animal lessens the effects of a disability by providing
companionship.111 Furthermore, these cases fail to make a distinction,
which is apparently being made in practice, supported by HUD con-
sent orders, between service animals that provide physical tasks and
those that provide emotional support.112
and enjoy the apartment, when he provided only the “ambiguous statement of his physi-
cian that depressed people may benefit from having pets and notes from his medical
records that he was anxious about possibly losing his dog”).
107 Zatopa v. Lowe, No. C 02–02543, slip op. at 14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2002) (Order
Granting Preliminary Injunction and Requiring Bond); see infra nn. 117–28 and accom-
panying text (discussing Lowe). One of the letters by the physician in Lowe stated “[a]n
emotional support animal is a pet — an animal whose function is to provide affection
and companionship, and does not need any special training.” Slip op. at 2.
108 Prindable, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. There are organizations that register or pro-
vide testing for animals that are to be used for therapeutic purposes at nursing homes,
hospitals, and schools. See Delta Socy., Pet Partners Program, http://
www.deltasociety.org/dsa000.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (discussing Delta Society’s
Pet Partners Program which trains and screens volunteers and their pets for visiting
animal programs); Therapy Dogs Inc., Therapy Dogs Inc., http://www.therapydogs.com/
downloads/member%20guidelines%202004.pdf (accessed Nov. 7, 2004) (discussing
Therapy Dogs, Inc., a non-profit volunteer program which offers a way to become a reg-
istered volunteer dog/handler team). These organizations’ testing programs focus on ba-
sic obedience skills, and, in the case of the Pet Partners program, focuses on a dog’s
aptitude or temperament for participating in animal assisted activities. Delta Socy., Pet
Partners Program, http://www.deltasociety.org/dsa000.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005).
The Delta Society website specifically distinguishes between service animals and ther-
apy animals. Delta Socy., Basic Information About Service Dogs, “The Difference Be-
tween Service Animals, Therapy Animals, Companion Animals and ‘Social/Therapy’
Animals,” http://www.deltasociety.org/nsdc/sdbasic.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005).
109 See supra nn. 5–16 and accompanying text (describing studies on the benefits of
companion animals on human health).
110 See supra nn. 99–100 and accompanying text (discussing LeBoo).
111 See supra nn. 101–03 and accompanying text (discussing Janush).
112 See HUD v. Bayberry Condo. Assn., 2002 WL 475240 at **1–2 (H.U.D.A.L.J. No.
02-00-0504-8 Mar. 21, 2002) (providing, in an initial decision and consent order, that a
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Based on the cases reported to date, it is clear that the emotional
distress expected to occur if a person is forced to give up an animal will
not support a claim that a reasonable accommodation must be
made.113 To increase the likelihood of successfully asserting that a rea-
sonable accommodation should be made, it is imperative that a link
between an existing disability and the services provided by the animal
occurs prior to any indication that the person may be asked to give up
an animal.
resident of a condominium suffering from depression, generalized anxiety, and panic
disorder be granted a waiver of a no-pet policy as a reasonable accommodation of her
handicap, with such animal being referred to as an “emotional support pet”); HUD v.
Meridian Group, Inc., 2001 WL 865717 at *1 (H.U.D.A.L.J. No. 05-98-1418-8 July 18,
2001) (providing, in a consent order, that a tenant who stated she was handicapped
because of manic depression would be given permission to have a cat in her unit); HUD
v. River York Stratford, L.L.C., 2000 WL 394074 at *2 (H.U.D.A.L.J. No. 02-99-0442-8
Apr. 14. 2000) (providing, in an initial decision and consent order, that a tenant suffer-
ing from anxiety would be able to retain her dog or a replacement dog of a similar size
upon proof of the alleged handicap in the form of a reasonably descriptive letter from
tenant’s physician, psychologist, or social worker); HUD v. Lerner, 2000 WL 46116 at *3
(H.U.D.A.L.J. No. 02-98-0179-8 Jan. 14, 2000) (providing, in an initial decision and con-
sent order, that a prospective tenant suffering from anxiety, depression, renal cancer,
pulmonary disease, and angina pectoris who obtained a pet dog on the advice of his
physician to abate symptoms of anxiety and depression will be offered an apartment in
a building with a no-pet rule upon receipt of a reasonably descriptive letter from the
prospective tenant’s physician); HUD v. Bay Ridge Condo., 1999 WL 137371 at *1
(HUDALJ No. 02-97-9769 Mar. 12, 1999) (providing, in a consent order, that a tenant
who, on the advice of her therapist, obtained a pet dog to lessen her symptoms of dys-
thymia and/or depression would be able to retain the dog (or a replacement of similar
size) if she provided a reasonably descriptive letter from her therapist or physician);
HUD v. Unique Restorations Co., 1998 WL 353869 at *2 (H.U.D.A.L.J. No. 2-97-0956-8
July 1, 1998) (ordering as part of a consent order that, if a tenant provides proof that
she suffered from chronic depression and that harboring of “Pumpkin” (a dog) is neces-
sary to the treatment and/or has therapeutic effects on her mental disability, a landlord
shall allow the tenant to keep the dog as an emotional support animal); HUD v. River-
bay Corp., 1995 WL 108212 (H.U.D.A.L.J. No. 02-93-0320-1 Sept. 8, 1994, modified,
H.U.D.A.L.J. No.  02-93-0320-1 March 1, 1995) (finding for a tenant with mental disa-
bilities in a case where there was no discussion of any certification or individual train-
ing); see also Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assoc. v. Fair Empl. & Hous. Commn., 121
Cal. App. 4th 1578 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2004) (There, the California Court of Appeals,
Third District, found that a dog did not need special skills to help ameliorate the effects
of the parties’ mental disabilities in a case interpreting the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act. Id. at 1596. “[I]t was the innate qualities of a dog, in particular a dog’s
friendliness and ability to interact with humans, that made it therapeutic here.” Id. The
California Court of Appeals found that the original administrative law judge’s finding
that the condominium association violated the FEHA by failing to permit the residents
to keep the dog as a reasonable accommodation to their disabilities should not have
been overturned by the trial court. Id. at 1599); but see HUD v. Blue Meadows LP, 2000
WL 898733 at **9, 11 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Nos. 10-99-0200-8, 10-99-0391-8 July 5, 2000)
(finding for a landlord who had requested verification that a dog was trained or certified
in a case where the dog was used by a prospective tenant to pull his wheelchair). The
landlord in Blue Meadows unsuccessfully requested payment of attorneys fees. Id. at
*5.
113 See supra nn. 44–50 and accompanying text (describing the Nason case, where a
doctor stated that the disability would be exacerbated by having to give up the animal).
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4. Only a Reasonable Accommodation is Required
It is clearly established that disabled persons are not restricted to
using only dogs and cats as service animals.114 Other species that are
used to assist persons with disabilities include monkeys, horses, and
birds.115 As discussed above, federal statutes do not attempt to define
the animals that can be used as service animals.116 Notwithstanding
the general rule that no particular type or breed of service animal is
valid, one district court ruled (regarding a motion for a preliminary
injunction) that a landlord is not required to allow a particular breed
to remain as a reasonable accommodation in the case of an emotional
support animal.117
In Zatopa v. Lowe, a tenant suffering from AIDS and long-term
clinical depression acquired a dog to help alleviate his symptoms in
violation of a no-pets provision in his lease.118 The dog that Lowe
adopted was a pit-bull terrier or pit-bull mix.119 There was disputed
testimony over what notice Lowe provided to his landlords regarding
his plan to acquire an emotional support animal.120
For purposes of the motion, the landlords conceded that Lowe was
disabled and the “laws in question required an emotional support
animal as a reasonable accommodation.”121 In correspondence be-
tween legal counsel leading up to the hearing on the motion, the type
of animal that Lowe chose became the central issue in the dispute.122
The landlords’ position was that having a pit bull in the building con-
stituted a nuisance and created “a substantial interference with the
114 Susan D. Semmel, When Pigs Fly, They Go First Class: Service Animals in the
Twenty-First Century, 3 Barry L. Rev. 39, 40 (2002) (discussing the evolution of service
animals in the United States, the variety of species being used, and the variety of tasks
for which they may be utilized). The Semmel article describes a case of a 300 pound
potbellied pig that was used as a service animal under the Air Carrier Access Act of
1986. Id. at 39. See also LaFore v. Hous. Auth. of Portland, 1999 WL 1058992 (D. Or.
Nov. 19, 1999) (wherein plaintiff alleged housing and disability discrimination, claiming
that her disabilities required her to have an opossum as an assistance animal in addi-
tion to a dog as a service animal). In LaFore, the Housing Authority denied plaintiff’s
claim for modification of the pet policy to permit her to keep the opossum, allegedly on
the ground that “opossums are not domesticated animals and can present some issues
because they are not normally inoculated, spayed/neutered and licensed.” Id. at *1. The
court dismissed the federal claims due to the running of the two year statute of limita-
tions, but remanded the state claims to state court for further proceedings. Id. at **3–4.
115 Semmel, supra n. 114, at 58; see also infra nn. 434–54 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of miniature horses as service animals in the cases involving munici-
pal ordinances and zoning).
116 See supra n. 51 and accompanying text. Some states have specified animals in
their assistance animal statutes. Semmel, supra n. 114, at 58.
117 Zatopa v. Lowe, No. C 02–02543, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2002) (Order
Granting Preliminary Injunction and Requiring Bond).
118 Id. at 2.
119 Id. at 3.
120 Id. at 2–3.
121 Id. at 5 n. 1.
122 Id. at 3–6.
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comfort, safety or enjoyment of the landlord and tenants in the build-
ing.”123 The landlords agreed to allow Lowe to keep a dog that was a
breed they considered to be “safe and gentle.”124
The District Court focused on whether the landlords were re-
quired to allow Lowe to keep this particular dog as a reasonable ac-
commodation.125 Analogous U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
decisions indicated that “an accommodation need not satisfy the par-
ticular preferences of the disabled person in order to be held reasona-
ble.”126 Considering the issues of both reasonable accommodation and
the equities, the court considered testimony of experts that discussed
the pit bull breed generally and Lowe’s dog individually.127 It found
that the “landlords’ offer of a dog belonging to a safe and gentle breed
constitutes a reasonable accommodation under both federal and state
law.”128
An example of the outer limits of reasonable accommodation,
where the breed of dog was not an issue, is the case of Woodside Vil-
lage v. Hertzmark, where a tenant with a mental disorder was unable
to adhere to pet rules.129 After making efforts to accommodate the ten-
ant, including arranging for a dog trainer and offering to provide addi-
tional support for the tenant, the apartment complex filed a request for
execution on a stipulated judgment.130
The stipulated judgment in Woodside Village granted the plaintiff
(apartment complex) possession of the apartment with a stay of execu-
tion subject to the defendant’s (tenant) compliance with rules relating
to walking his dog in designated areas and cleaning up the animal’s
123 Lowe, slip op. at 4.
124 Id. The landlords provided a non-exhaustive list of breeds they deemed accept-
able. Id. at 5.
125 Id. at 11–12. The court utilized cases discussing the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act to analyze the issue of reasonable accommodation. Id.
126 Id. at 12. The Lowe court recognized that there may be a violation of the law if a
landlord “stubbornly refuses to allow a preferable and clearly more effective accommo-
dation on arbitrary and capricious grounds.” Id. at 13.
127 Lowe, slip op. at 13, 15–17. The landlords’ expert provided generalizations about
the pit bull breed, including a statement that the pit bull breed is second only to the
Rottweiler breed in causing death or injury to persons in the United States. Id. at
15–16. Lowe’s experts focused on temperament tests provided by a veterinarian and the
co-founder of an organization focusing on responsible pit bull ownership. Id. at 16.
Lowe’s experts found the dog to be of good temperament. Id. The court found the expert
testimony offered by Lowe problematic due to the fact no evidence was presented on the
predictive value of the tests administered to the dog. Id. at 17.
128 Id. at 15. The court also considered the equities of the case, measuring the hard-
ship to the landlords and to the tenant, Lowe. Lowe, slip op. at 17–19. The court cited to
the public interest to support its finding that the balance of hardships tips toward the
landlords. Id. at 18–19. When the court considered the hardship to Lowe, it considered
Lowe’s acquisition of the pit bull as a self-inflicted injury and found that such injury
“cannot serve as the basis for a claim of hardship” in this context. Id. at 19.
129 1993 WL 268293 at *1 (Conn. Super. June 22, 1993), appeal dismissed, 36 Conn.
App. 73 (Conn. App. 1994).
130 Id. at *1.
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waste.131 The court focused on whether the accommodation made by
the plaintiff was reasonable.132 It reviewed cases that had considered
accommodations and found that there was no standard or precise mea-
surement to determine whether a proposed accommodation would be
reasonable.133 Similar cases evaluating the issue of animals in housing
were considered,134 but the circumstances in this case were found to be
different, because the health, safety, and comfort of other residents in
the complex were at risk.135 Plaintiff made reasonable accommoda-
tions for the tenant’s disability, and the tenant’s inability to follow the
rules did not make the plaintiff’s accommodations unreasonable.136
5. Financial Requirements
One issue that has not been directly addressed in appellate case
law to date is whether a disabled individual would be required to pay a
pet fee or pet deposit in order to keep a service animal in a unit.137 In
the consent order for HUD v. Purkett,138 an administrative law judge
enjoined the owners of an apartment complex from
charging a handicapped individual a deposit for maintaining an auxiliary
aid in the dwelling unit, when, because of the individual’s handicaps, it
may be necessary for the individual to use the auxiliary aid in order to
afford the individual an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling
unit, including public and common use areas. An auxiliary aid shall in-
clude, but not be limited to, any working animal which constitutes a guide
dog, a signal dog, or a service dog.139
This consent order also required the return of a one hundred dol-
lar pet deposit, but allowed the respondents to make all ordinary
131 Id. The trial court had approved a modified stipulated judgment in October 1992
on substantially the same terms. Id.
132 Id. at *4.
133 Id.
134 See supra n. 98 and accompanying text (discussing cases that the court consid-
ered, Whittier and Majors, which are discussed herein).
135 Woodside Village, 1993 WL 268293 at *5. The Woodside Village court utilized the
regulations implementing 12 U.S.C. § 1701r–1 for guidance in determining whether the
apartment complex’s pet rules were reasonable. Id; see infra Section B (discussing 12
U.S.C. § 1701r–1).
136 Woodside Village, 1993 WL 268293 at **5–6.
137 Pet deposits are specifically allowed under the other federal laws discussed
herein. See infra nn. 174, 206 and accompanying text (discussing the federal rules al-
lowing companion animals in public housing and housing for the elderly and handi-
capped receiving federal funding).
138 1990 WL 547183 (H.U.D.A.L.J. No. 09-89-1495-1 July 31,1990). The particular
circumstances leading to this consent order were not disclosed; however it was clear
that the tenant was physically disabled and used a specially trained service animal. Id.
at *2. HUD charged that the tenant was discriminated against, in part by the respon-
dents charging a pet deposit, but there were additional allegations of verbal harass-
ment. Id.
139 Id.
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charges against the tenant for any damages to her unit, other than
reasonable wear and tear.140
Discrimination against someone due to that person’s financial sta-
tus is not prohibited by the FHA.141 Some cases have held that eco-
nomic limitations caused by a person’s disability do not have to be
accommodated under the FHA.142 It is clear under the FHA that any
modification of the premises to be occupied by the disabled person is at
that disabled person’s expense.143 Thus, for example, if carpet had to
be removed to facilitate a service dog assisting someone in a wheel-
chair, that change would be at the expense of the tenant. A pet deposit
that is applicable to all persons with pets in a building, disabled or
non-disabled, is a more difficult question.
The Ninth Circuit, in U.S. v. California Mobile Home Park Man-
agement Co.,144 found that the FHA’s affirmative duty to reasonably
accommodate the needs of handicapped persons may require landlords
to assume reasonable financial burdens in accommodating handi-
capped residents. The court considered whether assessing a guest fee
and guest parking fee was acting in a discriminatory manner towards
a disabled person, as it was necessary for the disabled person to have a
home health care aide visit the home on a regular basis. The FHA was
interpreted as having clearly established that “landlords would have to
shoulder certain costs involved, so long as they are not unduly
burdensome.”145
140 Id. at *3. Additional damages in the amount of $60,000 were awarded to the ten-
ant in consideration of the tenant vacating the apartment and executing a release. Id. A
similar charge in another case indicates that HUD’s position on the imposition of pet
deposits is that they are inappropriate if the animal is a reasonable accommodation.
HUD v. Guenther, 2003 WL 1311333 at *1 (H.U.D.A.L.J. No. 08-00-0390-8 Mar. 9,
2003). In Guenther, the charge alleged that the landlord requested that a tenant pay a
pet deposit for his companion animal, and imposed a pet policy on the tenant after the
tenant had requested a reasonable accommodation for his handicap. Id.
141 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
142 Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apts., 136 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding
that apartment owner did not have to lease to disabled persons who were utilizing Sec-
tion 8 vouchers and concluding that the request was not required under the FHA, be-
cause it related to their economic situation, not their disabilities); Schanz v. Village
Apts., 998 F. Supp. 784, 790–91 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that a landlord was not
required to accept a guarantor agreement for a disabled person, because it related to the
person’s economic situation, not the prospective tenant’s disability); see generally Polly
W. Blakemore, Short of Money or Shortchanged? Reasonable Accommodations in Rental
Rules and Policies for Disabled Individuals Receiving Financial Assistance, 39 Brandeis
L.J. 449 (2000) (discussing Salute and Schanz and analyzing the issue of assistance
based claims for reasonable accommodations). Note that the Ninth Circuit in the
Giebeler case, discussed infra nn. 152–55, specifically discussed the Salute case and
rejected its reasoning.
143 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3). It is discriminatory to refuse to permit reasonable modifica-
tions; however, in the case of a rental, the landlord can require the premises be restored
to its original condition at the end of the tenancy. Id.
144 29 F.3d 1413 (9th Cir. 1994).
145 Id. at 1415–17. The court did not determine whether the fees in this case were
improperly assessed, but reversed and remanded the case to the district court to make
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The Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the claim by the landlord
that “any fee which is generally applicable to all residents of a housing
community cannot be discriminatory,”146 citing to evidence that
facially neutral rules that adversely impact disabled persons were also
intended to be covered by the FHA.147 An example provided by the
court was a landlord allowing a blind tenant to have a dog while im-
posing a high fee for exercising that right.148 “[F]ees that merit closer
scrutiny are those with unequal impact, imposed in return for permis-
sion to engage in conduct that . . . a landlord is required to permit.”149
Factors were set forth, which a reviewing court should examine to
determine whether the waiver of the fee would be acceptable,
including:
the amount of fees imposed, the relationship between the amount of fees
and the overall housing cost, the proportion of other tenants paying such
fees, the importance of the fees to the landlord’s overall revenues, and the
importance of the fee waiver to the handicapped tenant.150
In a later proceeding in California Mobile Home Park Manage-
ment Co., the Ninth Circuit emphasized the need to show that “the
waiver of the fees ‘may be necessary’ to afford [the resident] an equal
opportunity to use and enjoy her dwelling,” and found that the resident
in this case “failed to show that the assessment of the fees caused the
denial of her use and enjoyment of her dwelling.”151
The Ninth Circuit again considered the issue of financial accom-
modations for the disabled under the FHA in 2003 in Giebeler v. M & B
Associates, LP.152 The court utilized a recent U.S. Supreme Court case
interpreting the ADA to guide their analysis of the FHA and found: (1)
“an accommodation may indeed result in a preference for disabled indi-
viduals over otherwise similarly situated nondisabled individuals;”153
and (2) “accommodations may adjust for the practical impact of a disa-
bility, not only for the immediate manifestations of the physical or
mental impairment giving rise to the disability.”154 It was speculated
such a determination. Id. at 1418. The matter came before the Ninth Circuit again on
issues regarding the treatment of the tenant as a substituted party and the right to a
jury trial. U.S. v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1997). The
Ninth Circuit found that the lower court error was harmless as “upon the evidence
presented . . . no reasonable jury could have found for Cohen-Strong.” Id. at 1380 (cita-
tion omitted).
146 Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgt. Co., 29 F.3d. at 1417.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1418.
151 Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgt. Co., 107 F.3d at 1380.
152 343 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003). In Giebeler, a landlord rejected a disabled
individual’s request for a reasonable accommodation in allowing a family member to co-
sign on a lease that he could not qualify for based on his current income. Id. at 1145.
153 Id. at 1150.
154 Id.
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that mandating lower rents for disabled individuals would fail the rea-
sonableness inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court.155
One argument to be made in the case of service animals is that
handicapped tenants are more likely to incur pet fees due to their need
to keep service animals in their units. The analysis in the case of a pet
fee or pet deposit is of course complicated by the distinction the FHA
makes between reasonable accommodations for common areas and
those relating to the units themselves.156 In the absence of case law or
a regulation specifically addressing this issue, and given HUD’s posi-
tion charging discrimination when such fees are imposed,157 landlords
should be extremely cautious in requiring these types of fees.158
That said, based on the limited case law analyzing reasonable ac-
commodation of service animals, as well as the existence of the specific
provision relating to modifications to a unit, it appears clear that a
disabled tenant remains responsible for any damage done to the unit
by the animal.159
155 Id. at 1154.
156 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C)(i).
157 See supra nn. 137–40 and accompanying text (discussing cases where pet deposit
was raised as an issue).
158 In another case relating to pet fees, utilizing California law that parallels the
FHA, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (the “Commission”) found that
the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (the “Department”) had not estab-
lished that a waiver of a pet security deposit was necessary for a tenant to have equal
use and enjoyment of his housing. Dept. of Fair Empl. and Hous. v. Giosso, 2002 WL
471667 at *7 (Cal. F.E.H.C. No. 02–06 Jan. 10, 2002). In Giosso, a tenant, McDonald,
diagnosed with major recurrent depression moved into a no-pets building with a cat. Id.
at *2. Three years later, the manager reminded all the tenants about the no-pets policy.
Id. The complex found out that McDonald and two other tenants had cats. Id. at *3. The
tenants with the cats were informed they could keep the cats in their units if they paid a
pet security deposit of $250. Id. The other two tenants paid the deposit, but McDonald
communicated to the complex manager “that his cat was not a pet but rather a ‘service
animal,’ and that he was not required to pay a pet security deposit for a ‘service
animal.’” Id. at *4. Eventually, McDonald paid the pet deposit, which was returned to
him in full when he moved out of the complex. Giosso, 2002 WL 471667 at *5. The
Commission found that the Department did not show that the pet security deposit de-
nied McDonald an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his unit. Id. at *6. The Commis-
sion further found that the $250 pet security deposit was a reasonable sum to secure
against any damage that the cat might cause. Id. at *7. The Commission found that the
Department’s citations to federal regulations, clarifying that the pet rules for Pet Own-
ership in Assisted Rental Housing for the Elderly or Handicapped (POEH) were applica-
ble to service animals and that “a provision in the ‘ADA Technical Assistance
Manual’ . . . regarding deposits for ‘service animals’ in non-housing public accommoda-
tions . . . [was] inapposite to the private housing accommodation in this case.” Id. at *8
n. 1 (citations omitted). A later Commission decision found that allowing a dog in a
condominium with a no-dog policy would be a reasonable accommodation. Dept. of Fair
Empl. and Hous. v. Auburn Woods I Homeowners Assn., Nonprofit Mutual Corp., 2002
WL 1313063 at *12 (Cal. F.D.H.C. No. 02-11 May 7, 2002).
159 See supra n. 38 and accompanying text (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)).
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6. Damages Available under the FHA
As stated above, relief for violation of the FHA may include actual
and punitive damages, injunctions, and attorney fees at the discretion
of the court.160 An example is the administrative adjudication of HUD
v. Dutra, relating to a case of a disabled tenant, Evans, who was
threatened with eviction if he did not get rid of his cat.161 Evans had
listed on his rental application that he was disabled, and that he
owned a cat.162 There was some evidence that the property manager
was unaware that the tenant’s cat was more than a pet at the begin-
ning of the lease period, but, eventually, Evans made statements that
the cat was necessary for therapeutic purposes.163 Evans provided a
variety of statements from medical professionals supporting his claim
that his cat served a therapeutic purpose.164 After Evans filed a com-
plaint alleging discrimination in housing because of a physical and
mental handicap, the landlord dismissed an unlawful detainer action
and executed an amendment to Evans’s lease permitting him to keep a
cat in his unit.165
The administrative law judge found that individuals involved in
the management of the property and the owner of the apartments had
violated the FHA.166 She awarded economic damages, including attor-
neys fees, as well as the costs of prescription medication and a hospital
visit that were related to the acute anxiety triggered by the threatened
eviction.167 Five thousand dollars was awarded to Evans for damages
attributed to emotional distress and physical suffering.168 The loss of
civil rights was also claimed in this case.169 Since Evans was not de-
prived of possession of his cat, the administrative law judge awarded
only a modest amount for both physical injury and emotional dis-
160 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612–3613 (2000).
161 1996 WL 657690 at **1–3 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 09–93–1753–8 Nov. 12, 1996), initial con-
sent and order on application for fees, 1997 WL 259158 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 09–93–1753–8
May 13, 1997). The tenant in this case had fibromyalgia and was dependent on Supple-
mental Social Security Income Payments. Id. at *1. HUD was the Charging Party in
this case with Mr. Evans as an Intervenor. Id.
162 Dutra, 1996 WL 657690 at *2.
163 Id. at **2–5.
164 Id. at **6–7.
165 Id. at *7.
166 Id. at **10, 11.
167 Id. at *12. The initial consent and order on application for fees allowed for the
tenant’s (Intervenor) attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $16,392.79 to be added to
the order. Dutra, 1997 WL 259158 at *7 (H.U.D.A.L.J. 09–93–2753–8 May 13, 1997).
168 Id. at *14. The administrative law judge referenced the fact that Evans was never
separated from his pet and never forced to move in, finding that the requested emo-
tional damages of $75,000 by Evans was excessive. Id. HUD also unsuccessfully re-
quested emotional distress damages in the amount of $25,000. Id.
169 Id. at *15. This is a separate injury under the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g).
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tress.170 Finally, a civil penalty of $5,000 was assessed against the
respondents.171
Although the damages awarded in Dutra were modest, the case
illustrates the various remedies available to a prevailing party.172 Du-
tra acts as a warning for housing providers who adopt a standard no-
pets clause without clarifying that such clause provides an exemption
for service animals. Furthermore, it emphasizes the need to train per-
sonnel like the resident managers in Dutra, who continued to attempt
to enforce the no-pets clause even after they were notified that Evans’s
cat might serve a therapeutic purpose, on the requirements of the FHA
and the rights that disabled tenants may have to keep a service animal
in their unit.173
B. Elderly and Handicapped Housing
As part of the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983,
Congress passed a rule titled Pet Ownership in Assisted Rental Hous-
ing for the Elderly or Handicapped (POEH).174 POEH provides that
owners and managers of federally assisted rental housing for the eld-
erly or handicapped cannot prohibit or prevent a tenant from owning
common household pets.175 The legislative history of POEH indicates
that the provision was passed in response to the fact that,
“[a]lthough . . . HUD . . . [had not] issued regulations governing the
keeping of pets, an absolute ‘no-pet’ policy [had been] widely practiced
in Federally-assisted rental projects.”176 The Senate Report by the
170 Dutra, 1996 WL 657690 at *15.
171 Id. at **15–17. Injunctive relief was also granted to enjoin the respondents from
discriminating or retaliating against Evans. Id. at *17.
172 Id. at *17; see also supra nn. 138–40 and accompanying text (discussing another
administrative hearing that awarded damages).
173 Dutra, 1996 WL 657690 at **2, 4.
174 12 U.S.C. § 1701r–1 (2000). There has been a significant amount of research spe-
cifically focused on the benefits of allowing the elderly to have access to companion ani-
mals. See e.g. H. Marie Suthers-McCabe, Take One Pet and Call Me in the Morning, 25
Generations 93 (2001) (discussing studies that show a positive influence of pets on the
health of the elderly).
175 12 U.S.C. § 1701r–1(a). The definition of common household pet is: “[a] domesti-
cated animal, such as a dog, cat, bird, rodent (including a rabbit), fish or turtle, that is
traditionally kept in the home for pleasure rather than for commercial purposes. Com-
mon household pet does not include reptiles (except turtles).” 24 C.F.R. Subtitle A
§ 5.306(1) (2004). If there is a conflict with state or local law defining the pets that may
be owned or kept in dwelling accommodations, the state or local law would apply. Id. An
example would be the ban on ferrets in a California and Hawaii. Steve Chawkins, Pet
Cause for Ferret Fans; Enthusiasts Hope the Governor Will Revoke a State Ban, L.A.
Times B1 (Dec. 27, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 68907335) (discussing the effort by
advocates in California to legalize the ownership of ferrets in that state).
176 Sen. Rpt. 98–142 at 41 (May 23, 1983) (reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1770,
1812). The Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs believed that such a
blanket policy was inappropriate for projects designed for the elderly and handicapped.
Id. at 40, 41.
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Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs stated the
following:
Evidence from numerous studies show that pets provide substantial physi-
cal and mental benefits to older persons, particularly those who live inde-
pendently. It is the Committee’s view that these benefits warrant
Congressional action to prevent arbitrary rule-making in Federally-as-
sisted projects.177
POEH allows for the removal of pets if such pets constitute a nui-
sance, and provides that HUD should establish regulations to create
guidelines for owners and managers to prescribe reasonable rules re-
garding pets.178 HUD established an extensive set of regulations to
implement POEH.179 The regulations distinguish between “Housing
programs”180 and “Public Housing;”181 the description herein will fo-
cus on the regulations for Housing programs.
The HUD regulations clarify that animals assisting persons with
disabilities are excluded from the requirements set forth therein, and
state that project owners and public housing agencies “may not apply
or enforce any pet rules developed under this subpart against individu-
als with animals that are used to assist persons with disabilities.”182
The regulations provide that tenants are to be given notice of the
rights they have under the law, and are to be given access to any pet
rules developed in accordance with the regulations.183 The pet rules
themselves are divided into discretionary and mandatory rules.184
The mandatory rules include the following requirements. First,
pet owners must have their pets inoculated in accordance with state
and local laws.185 Second, sanitary standards must be set governing
the disposal of pet waste, including specific limitations on the number
of times a week that a pet owner is required to change the litter in a
litter box.186 Third, pets are required to be “restrained and under the
control of a responsible individual while on the common areas.”187
Fourth, the pet owners must register their pets and update their regis-
tration at least annually.188 This registration must include contact in-
177 Id. at 41.
178 12 U.S.C. § 1701r–1(b), (c).
179 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.300 et seq. (2003).
180 Id. at § 5.306. Housing program is defined as “housing programs administered by
the Assistant Secretary for Housing-Federal Housing Commissioner” and other pro-
grams “that assist rental projects that meet the definition of project for the elderly or
persons [further defined] in subpart C.” Id.
181 Id. Public Housing includes “[a]ny project assisted under title I of the United
States Housing Act,” excluding certain other projects. Id.
182 24 C.F.R. at § 5.303.
183 Id. at § 5.312.
184 Id. at §§ 5.318, 5.350.
185 Id. at § 5.350(a). Discretionary standards allow pet rules to require pet owners to
license their pets in accordance with State and local law. Id. at § 5.318(f).
186 Id. at § 5.350(b).
187 24 C.F.R. at § 5.350(c).
188 Id. at § 5.350(d).
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formation for “one or more responsible parties who will care for the pet
if the pet owner dies, is incapacitated, or is otherwise unable to care for
the pet.”189
The discretionary pet rules provide for some flexibility to reflect
the needs of each housing project. These rules allow reasonable limita-
tions on the number of pets in each unit and specifically state that
“project owners may limit the number of four-legged, warm-blooded
pets to one pet in each dwelling unit.”190 Reasonable restrictions on
the size, weight, and type of animals in each project may be mandated
under the discretionary pet rules.191 Pet deposits are allowed; how-
ever, they are limited to the equivalent of one month’s rent or to an
amount set by HUD periodically, depending on the type of housing.192
The discretionary pet rules also set out standards of pet care.193
The pet rules cannot require that a pet’s vocal cords be removed, but
may require that dogs and cats are spayed or neutered.194 It is also
possible to bar pets from specified common areas, unless such exclu-
sions deny a pet “reasonable ingress and egress to the project or build-
ing.”195 Pet owners may be required to control noise and odor caused
by a pet.196 Finally, pet rules may “limit the length of time a pet may
be left unattended in a dwelling.”197
If a tenant violates a pet rule, a procedure set out in the regula-
tions establishes minimum notice and meeting requirements before
steps can be taken to remove a pet or terminate a pet owner’s
tenancy.198
The regulations also provide for the removal of the pets covered by
this law under specified circumstances.199 Essentially, the project
owner can contact the responsible party (named in the registration) if
the health or safety of a pet is threatened by the death or incapacity of
the pet owner.200 If the named responsible party is unwilling or unable
to care for the pet or cannot be contacted, the project owner can contact
the appropriate state or local authority to request removal of the
pet.201 If the lease agreement contains language providing for such re-
189 Id. at § 5.350(d)(iii).
190 Id. at § 5.318(b)(1)(ii).
191 Id. at § 5.318(c). At least one housing authority outside of the state of California
has banned ferrets. Michael Booth, No Ferret: Denver Widow Cries Foul at Public Hous-
ing Rule Banning Pet, Denver Post B01 (July 19, 2002) (available at 2002 WL 6571822)
(discussing a dispute between a tenant with a ferret and the Denver Housing Author-
ity). It was unclear in this newspaper story whether the housing at issue was housing
for the elderly or handicapped, or public housing generally. Id.
192 24 C.F.R. § 5.318(d).
193 Id. at § 5.318(e).
194 Id.
195 Id. at § 5.318(e)(1).
196 Id. at § 5.318(e)(2).
197 Id. at § 5.318(e)(3).
198 24 C.F.R. at § 5.356.
199 Id. at § 5.363.
200 Id. at § 5.363(a).
201 Id. at § 5.363(b).
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moval, the project owner can enter the unit, remove the pet, and place
it in a facility that will provide for care and shelter for a period of time
not exceeding thirty days, with the pet owner bearing the cost of the
facility.202
As with state laws prohibiting discrimination against the handi-
capped, some states have passed laws providing similar provisions re-
lating to pets in state-supported public housing for the elderly.203
Although there were concerns about allowing pets in housing, the
problems that HUD expected apparently have not arisen, and individ-
ual housing providers have reported that the senior tenants take excel-
lent care of their pets.204 The trend to allow pets in housing supported
by the federal government is illustrated further by the enactment of
the Pet Ownership in Public Housing Act discussed below.205
C. Public Housing
The most recently passed federal law affecting companion animals
in housing is the Pet Ownership in Public Housing (POPH) law.206
POPH became effective and applicable on October 1, 1999, and the
rules implementing POPH were effective on August 9, 2000.207 The
terms of POPH are similar to those of POEH; however, the statute spe-
cifically states that the term “public housing” does not include feder-
ally assisted rental housing for the elderly or handicapped (the
housing subject to POEH).208 Under POPH, residents of public hous-
ing may own one or more common household pets subject to the “rea-
sonable requirements of the public housing agency.”209 The legislative
history discussing POPH references POEH and states, “[it] has been
202 Id. at § 5.363(c), (d).
203 Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 19901 (West 2002) (provision relating to pets in
public housing for elderly or persons requiring supportive services, stating “no public
agency which owns and operates rental housing accommodations, shall prohibit the
keeping of not more than two pets by an elderly person or person requiring supportive
services in the rental housing accommodations.”); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42–103 to 111
(2000) (providing that persons in senior citizen housing projects in New Jersey are per-
mitted to own a domestic animal while residing in those projects).
204 John Freeman, CHA Pet Policy, Chi. Trib. 20 (Mar. 26, 1998) (available at 1998
WL 2839016) (Author, President of the American Veterinary Medical Association,
states that “the Department of Housing and Urban Development recently admitted that
problems they foresaw never materialized.”); Diane C. Lade, Sticking Together; Under a
Little-Known HUD Rule, Tenants’ Pets Are Welcome in Federal Housing, S. Fla. Sun-
Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla) 1B (Feb. 6, 2002) (available at 2002 WL 2945367) (report-
ing on the application of POEH in selected Florida housing complexes).
205 Infra pt. II(C).
206 42 U.S.C. § 1437z–3 (2000).
207 Id. The effective date for the final rules implementing POPH was August 9, 2000.
Pet Ownership in Public Housing, 65 Fed. Reg. 42518 (July 10, 2000).
208 42 U.S.C. § 1437z–3(c); see supra pt. II(B) (discussing the terms of POEH).
209 42 U.S.C. § 1437z–3(a) (stating that the resident must maintain “each pet respon-
sibly and in accordance with applicable State and local public health, animal control,
and animal anti-cruelty laws and regulations and with the policies established in the
public housing agency plan for the agency”).
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demonstrated, particularly with respect to the elderly, that pet owner-
ship can add to the quality of life of individuals, families, and
communities.”210
The adoption of POPH and the regulations implementing it were
controversial.211 There were reports that urban public housing manag-
ers across the country were concerned about the responsibilities of pet
ownership and feared that there would be problems with noise, waste,
and injuries due to biting.212 Some residents of public housing were
also wary of the idea.213 In addition, some local humane societies
raised concerns over the ability of persons with limited financial
means to care for animals and the possibility that the number of aban-
doned animals could increase.214
The rules implementing POPH received more comments than any
other Public Housing Reform Act regulation.215 While HUD altered a
few of the provisions based on the comments (for example, by providing
for any state and local laws relating to pet deposits to apply), it re-
210 The Public Housing Reform and Responsibility Act of 1997, Sen. Rpt. 105–21 at
*32 (May 23, 1997) (available at 1997 WL 282462).
211 Gina Holland, Pets OK’d for Public Housing, Houston Chron. 22 (July 1, 2001)
(available at 2001 WL 23611576) (discussing new rules and problems in the implemen-
tation in the policy); Lisa J. Huriash & Enma Leyva, Broward’s Public Housing Opens
Its Doors to Cats, Dogs, S. Fla. Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.) 1 (July 29, 2001)
(available at 2001 WL 22747162) (discussing new rules for the Broward County Hous-
ing Authority and concerns of the housing officials in the area); Cindy Skrzycki, The
Regulators: HUD’s Pro-pet Rule Ruffles Some Feathers, Wash. Post E01 (July 25, 2000)
(available at 2000 WL 19620898) (discussing policy and comments to rulemaking);
Tasha Thomas, Dogs (and Cats) to Have Their Day in Public Housing Starting Aug. 1,
Columbus Dispatch (Ohio) 04E (July 18, 2001) (available at 2001 WL 23571727) (dis-
cussing the change in policy for the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority and con-
cerns of the housing authority and local humane society representatives); see infra
Section IV pt. E (discussing the problem of dog bites).
212 Don’t Send CHA to the Dogs, Chi. Trib. 24 (Mar. 12, 1998) (available at 1998 WL
2834097) (warning in an editorial about the potential problems if public housing re-
sidents are allowed to keep dogs and cats); Morningline, Chi. Sun-Times 32 (Feb. 26,
1998) (available at 1998 WL 5568644) (a telephone poll reported that eighty-one percent
of the people who called in answered “no” to the question of “[s]hould public housing
residents be allowed to have pets in their apartments?”).
213 Leon Pitt, CHA Tenants Wary of Pet OK: Congress Considers Lifting Ban, Chi.
Sun-Times 9 (Feb. 25, 1998) (available at 1998 WL 5568532) (quoting concerned re-
sidents and tenant leaders in Chicago Public Housing).
214 Holland, supra n. 211, at 2 (quoting a worker at a Birmingham, Alabama, shel-
ter); Tasha Thomas, Dogs (and Cats) to Have Their Day in Public Housing Starting Aug.
1, Columbus Dispatch (Ohio) 04E (July 18, 2001) (available at 2001 WL 23571727)
(quoting Jim Cunningham, executive director of the Capital Area Humane Society as
saying “[we] don’t believe most would be bad pet owners as far as taking care of their
emotional needs, but there is a financial responsibility”).
215 Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: HUD’s Pro-Pet Rule Ruffles Some Feathers,
Wash. Post E01 (July 25, 2000) (available at 2000 WL 19620898) (discussing policy and
comments to rulemaking). HUD reported that it received 3,777 comments prior to the
end of the comment period for the rules with approximately three thousand additional
comments being received after the end of the comment period. Pet Ownership in Public
Housing, 65 Fed. Reg. 42518, 42519 (July 10, 2000).
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sisted setting forth specific rules on many issues, preferring to allow
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) to set their own rules.216
Similar to the discretionary rules implementing POEH, the rea-
sonable requirements set by the PHAs may include:
(1) requiring payment of a nominal fee, a pet deposit or both . . . (2) limita-
tions on the number of animals in a unit, based on unit size; (3) prohibi-
tions on (A) types of animals that are classified as dangerous; and (B)
individual animals, based on certain factors, including the size and weight
of the animal; and (4) restrictions or prohibitions based on size and type of
building or project . . . .217
The regulations supporting POPH are much less extensive than
the regulations for POEH.218 In addition to the requirements stated in
the statute described above, the public housing authority can require
that the pet be registered, or that they be spayed or neutered, but may
not require pet owners to have any pet’s vocal chords removed.219
Some public housing authorities have interpreted POPH in a man-
ner that allows them to prohibit dogs and cats in high-rise or multi-
family buildings.220 In addition, the implementation of the new pet
rules by housing authorities in some areas has been slow and not
widely publicized, which effectively limits the ability of a tenant to
keep a pet in that housing.221 Finally, there were reports that public
housing residents did not rush to obtain animals; these were attrib-
uted in part to the cost, including the nonrefundable pet fees and de-
posits that are allowed by POPH.222 Notwithstanding the concern over
216 Pet Ownership in Public Housing, 65 Fed. Reg. 42518, 42521 (July 10, 2000) (to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. Pt. 960).
217 42 U.S.C. § 1437z-3(b); see e.g. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Notice: New York City Hous-
ing Authority Pet Policy, (N.Y. City Hous. Auth. Nov. 17, 2003) (available at http://
nyc.gov/html/nycha/pdf/pet_policy_engl.pdf) (providing for a limit of one dog or cat and
limiting the weight of the dog to forty pounds, with a grandfather provision allowing
exceptions for pets owned before May 1, 2002); E-Mail from James M. Owenby, Com-
mun., Seattle Hous. Auth., to Rebecca J. Huss, Prof. of L., Val. U. Sch. of L., Hous. Auth.
of the City of Seattle Pet Policy Lease Rider (Feb. 9, 2004, 10:35 a.m. EDT) (copy on file
with Author) (prohibiting pitbulls or pitbull mixes and limiting dogs or cats to fifteen
inches in height at the shoulder or thirty-five pounds in weight).
218 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.701 et. seq. (2004).
219 Id. at § 960.707(b)–(c).
220 Chicago Housing Authority, Chicago Housing Authority: Pet Policy §§ 1.02(1),
1.02(1)(b), http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/files/pet_policy_and_procedures_0504.
pdf (Oct. 21, 2003) (prohibiting dogs and cats in high rise and mid rise buildings); Cath-
erine Gilfether, Tight Leash on Pets in Public Housing: Multifamily Unites in Lorain
Would Ban Dogs, Cats, But Not Fish, Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) 3B (Mar. 29, 2001)
(available at 2001 WL 20543712) (discussing policy of the Lorain Metropolitan Housing
Authority which allows small dogs and cats at “scattered site” units but not at multi-
family sites). There have been no published cases to date interpreting POPH.
221 Lori Weisberg, Oh, by the Way, HUD Tenants Can Have Pets, San Diego Union-
Trib. I1 (Mar. 17, 2002) (available at 2002 WL 4591009) (discussing the San Diego
Housing Commission’s rewriting of its pet policy almost two years after the HUD rules
were announced).
222 24 C.F.R. § 960.707(b)(1); Michelle Crouch, Price of Having Pets Drops in Public
Housing: Refundable Deposit Falls to $600 but It Still Tops Charges in the Private Sec-
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problems attributable to allowing pets and implementing a pet policy,
if the experience of administrators with housing for the elderly and
handicapped is any indication, when a pet policy is being followed, sig-
nificant problems should not arise due to the presence of the animals
pursuant to the new rule.223
That said, there are important issues that will need to be dealt
with as more animals are allowed in public housing, especially in ur-
ban areas. Specifically, ongoing concerns with maintenance and bites
will continue to be issues that housing authorities and residents will
need to deal with in order for pets in public housing to be workable in
the long run.224
An important alternative to traditional public housing projects is
the use of Section 8 vouchers and other programs relying upon private
housing.225 Section 8 allows persons eligible for public housing to rent
from private owners, with the private housing provider given a subsidy
directly from the government for each Section 8 tenant.226 Because
private housing that is being subsidized by Section 8 is not considered
tor, Charlotte Observer 6B (Mar. 26, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 15317221) (reporting
on the cut of the refundable pet deposit in public housing units from $1,500 to $600,
which is still considerably higher than pet deposits charged by most private housing
providers); Lisa J. Huriash & Enma Leyva, Broward’s Public Housing Opens Its Doors
to Cats, Dogs, Sun-Sentinel 1 (July 29, 2001) (available at 2001 WL 22747162) (citing to
housing authorities in Broward County who reported that they did not have problems
because no residents have gotten cats or dogs). Some housing authorities do not track
the number of residents that have pets so it is difficult to determine the impact of
POPH. E-Mail from James M. Owenby, supra n. 217 (stating that the Seattle Housing
Authority does not have a good way to track the number of residents that have pets).
223 Gilfether, supra n. 220, at 3B (citing to one housing authority where no problems
had been reported for the first four months of the policy and to a problem with a pit bull
in another housing authority, where such breed would be banned under the terms of the
proposed pet policy).
224 Telephone Interview with Howard Marder, Pub. Info. Officer, N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.
[hereinafter NYCHA] (Feb. 4, 2004) (Mr. Marder stated that there are ongoing concerns
about maintenance issues and problems with animals biting in housing provided by his
organization. NYCHA is the largest housing authority in North America with 2,702
buildings and approximately 416,000 residents. Prior to POPH, the official policy of
NYCHA was that no pets were allowed, with the exception of service animals and ani-
mals in housing for the elderly and handicapped. Under the current NYCHA pet policy,
pets are required to be registered with NYCHA. As of the end of 2003 there were only
1,384 dogs registered. However, Mr. Marder stated that he believed there were “quite a
bit” more animals in the units. NYCHA had a designated “dog hotline” for complaints
about dogs (the dog hotline has since been combined with New York City’s general infor-
mation line). In approximately five years there have been 6,009 complaints to the dog
hotline.).
225 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (2000).
226 Id.; see generally Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Hous-
ing Act’s New Frontier, 31 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev 155, 156–58 (1996)
(describing the Section 8 program generally); Dan Nnamdi Mbulu, Affordable Housing:
How Effective Are Existing Federal Laws in Addressing the Housing Needs of Lower
Income Families, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Policy & L. 387, 397–99 (2000) (discussing
Section 8 and the growth of the program and noting that there are other variations of
this program, including one in which HUD provides Section 8 subsidies to landlords to
rehabilitate multi-family units.).
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“public housing,” a tenant in public housing may be able to keep a com-
panion animal, whereas a tenant in private housing using a Section 8
voucher will not be able to keep a companion animal, if the private
owner bans pets from its buildings.227 In fact, one report states “[pri-
vate] owners of low-income housing dislike the idea [of pets] so much
that they got themselves exempted from the legislation.”228 There are
certainly good reasons why these housing complexes were excluded
from the application of POPH. As there is no requirement to accept
Section 8 vouchers, a rule requiring these private landlords to accept
pets would serve as a deterrent to the participation of landlords in the
program, therefore reducing the options available to low income te-
nants. Thus, persons who rely on public housing, and who want to
have or keep a pet, will be required to make a difficult choice: stay in
the housing that is required to allow pets, or move to perhaps a better
geographic area and building and lose the right to have pets.229
D. Application of Federal Laws
Given the relatively recent effective dates of the federal laws dis-
cussed above, it is not surprising that there are few cases analyzing
this statutory language.230 It does appear clear, from passage of these
laws, that legislators have begun to accept the evidence of the impor-
tance of companion animals to a significant number of people. In inter-
preting these laws, judges need to be sensitive to the growing body of
literature that supports the health benefits of living with companion
animals. It is clear that the interests of housing providers and tenants
without companion animals in their lives, whose health, safety and
comfort are affected by the companion animals of other tenants, must
be considered as well.231 Case law has established that a cost-benefit
analysis is appropriate when considering whether an accommodation
is reasonable under the FHA.232 Congress has made this type of cost-
227 Note, however, that the private owners are subject to the terms of the FHA; thus,
disabled persons who need service animals would be entitled to a reasonable accommo-
dation that may mean an exception to a no-pets policy. See supra nn. 52–128, 161-73
and accompanying text (cases discussing waivers of no-pets rules).
228 Skrzycki, supra n. 215, at E01 (discussing policy and comments to rulemaking).
229 Of course, some private landlords also allow pets, but given the number of cases
generated for breach of no-pet clauses (see infra n. 248 and accompanying text), it is
clear that there is not a surplus of rental housing where pets are allowed.
230 Search of Westlaw, ALLFEDS database (Nov. 5, 2004) (searching for the terms
“42 U.S.C. 1437” (POPH) and “12 U.S.C. 1701” (POEH) with a date after 2000 and find-
ing 3 results (Rivera v. Phipps Houses Services, Inc., 2001 WL 740779 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Mass., 2002); University, Ltd.,
v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 2003 WL 1145438 (E.D. Wis. 2003)).
231 See supra nn. 118–36 and accompanying text (cases considering the effects of ser-
vice animals on landlords and other tenants).
232 Bronk, 54 F.3d at 429 (citing U.S. v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th
Cir. 1994) and Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
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benefit analysis for tenants and landlords of public housing.233 The
regulations that HUD has established to administer POEH and POPH
provide adequate assurances that tenants without companion animals,
as well as property owners, are not unduly inconvenienced by pets in
the buildings. As the Secretary of HUD in 2001 stated, “[The] benefits
that can come to children and the elderly are far larger than the man-
agement problems.”234
In analyzing the FHA, the issue of what type of training an animal
must have in order to be considered a service animal will continue to
be problematic, especially when the disabled person at issue is suffer-
ing from emotional or psychological disabilities. Although the physi-
cally disabled continue to be faced with ignorance about the use of
service animals, there is clearly a wider acceptance of the use of ser-
vice animals that are familiar.235 As more studies show a therapeutic
link between psychological disabilities and the presence of companion
animals, the use of animals for this purpose should become more ac-
ceptable.236 Unfortunately, as seen by the relatively long period of
time for the acceptance of service animals for the physically disabled
and the continuing evidence of problems in this area, it appears likely
that those with psychological disabilities will be forced to establish the
standard of their treatment on a case-by-case basis.
III. ISSUES IN RENTAL HOUSING AND CONDOMINIUMS
A. Rental Housing
Absent a specific statutory restriction, a landlord may have a no-
pets policy in leased premises. An increasing number of organizations
provide information to tenants on non-legal avenues to bypass these
types of restrictions.237 In addition, information is available to land-
lords that encourages renting to persons who have pets.238
233 See supra nn. 209–19 and accompanying text (discussing the costs and benefits
accounted for in POPH).
234 Holland, supra n. 211, at 22 (quoting to the Secretary of HUD Mel Martinez dis-
cussing the implementation of POPH).
235 Delta Socy., Basic Information about Service Dogs, http://www.deltasociety.org/
nsdc/sdbasic.htm#difference (accessed Mar. 12, 2005).
236 See supra nn. 4–9 and accompanying text (discussing impact of companion ani-
mals on human health).
237 See e.g. Animal Leg. Def. Fund, Resources, “Legal Information,” http://www.aldf.
org/packets.asp?sect=resources (accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (providing some common-sense
rules for dealing with issues of companion animals and rental housing, in addition to
links to many other animal law issues); Delta Socy., Companion Animals in the Com-
munity, “Pets in Housing,” http://www.deltasociety.org/dsz000.htm (accessed Mar. 12,
2005) (providing information on many aspects of companion animal ownership and the
human-animal bond).
238 See e.g. Doresa Banning, Northtown Summit: Among Many Amenities Are Corpo-
rate Apartments, Acceptance of Large Dogs, Reno Gazette 42 (Oct. 4, 2003) (available at
2003 WL 64979982) (discussing upscale apartment community that allows large dogs
and has two dog parks); Peter Demarco, Landlords: Despite Case, It’s Easier to Rent
with Pet, 5/18/03 Boston Globe 14 (May 18, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 3397244) (re-
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Restrictions on keeping pets in rental housing have a significant
impact on tenants, who are forced to choose between their home and
their pet, leading some to relinquish their animals to shelters.239 One
study found that thirty-five percent of people without a pet would keep
a pet if their rental housing allowed animals.240 Landlords may place
significant restrictions on pets including allowing only cats, birds or
fish or limiting the size and breed of the animals.241
The average pet deposit is around $225, but flat fees range from
$20 to $700.242 Some landlords also require a monthly surcharge for
pets.243 Landlords also often impose regulations relating to animals
porting on an increase in pet friendly apartment listings attributed to a sluggish rental
market); Andrew Guy, Jr., Pet Peeves: It’s Hard but Not Impossible to Find Apartments
That Will Accept Your Dog or Cat, Houston Chron. 1 (Oct. 6, 2003) (available at 2003
WL 57447799) (discussing restrictive pet policies, specifically the difficulty in finding
housing that allows dogs); Elaine Lee, Dog People Only Need Apply, Bark 24 (Fall 2001)
(discussing pet screening formula and reasons to rent to pet owners as well as refer-
ences for landlords); C. Kalimah Redd, Tossing Dog Owners a Treat in Competitive Mar-
ket, More Housing Complexes Welcoming Pets Landlords Toss Pet Owners a Treat,
Boston Globe 1 (Jan. 1, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 59765032) (discussing a rental
complex that caters to pet owners); Mim Swartz, Pets Allowed: Dumb Friends League
Helps Owners Find Accommodating Landlords, Rocky Mt. News (Denver, Colo.) 4F
(Aug. 25, 2001) (available at 2001 WL 7380943) (reporting on the difficulty of finding
rental housing that allows animals and a program that educates landlords); Michelle
Cobey, Pets in Housing Resources, http://www.deltasociety.org/dsz100.htm (accessed
Oct. 15, 2004) (reporting on the San Francisco SPCA Open Door Program that has in-
creased the number of rental units in the area that allow animals).
239 Phillip H. Kass et al., Understanding Animal Companion Surplus in the United
States: Relinquishment of Nonadoptables to Animal Shelters for Euthanasia, 4 J. Ap-
plied Animal Welfare Sci. 237, 238 (2001) (stating that “[some] view the problem of
euthanasia performed at animal shelters not as a problem of an overabundance of un-
wanted animals but, instead, as an underavailability of homes (i.e. when residential
regulations or leases prohibit pet ownership)”); John C. New, Jr. et al., Moving: Charac-
teristics of Dogs and Cats and Those Relinquishing Them to 12 U.S. Animal Shelters, 2
J. Applied Animal Welfare Sci. 83, 84 (1999) (citing a study that reported that “moving
was the most often cited of seventy-one reasons for relinquishing dogs and the third
most common reason for relinquishing cats”); Rental Housing On Line, No Pets Allowed
in Most Rental Housing, http://rhol.org/rental/pets.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (esti-
mating that twenty-five percent of the animals surrendered to shelters are relinquished
because their owners cannot find affordable rental housing that allows their pets);
Robyn Watts, The Legal Ins and Outs of Pet Ownership and Housing, http://
www.deltasociety.org/dsz101.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (citing to study that indi-
cated that nine percent of animals are relinquished to shelters due to problems with a
landlord, and that the fact that most animals relinquished to shelters are euthanized
adds to the stress that a tenant feels when making a decision about their housing
options).
240 Hart & Kidd, supra n. 13, at 24; see also Cobey, supra n. 238 at “Humane Society
of the U.S.” (discussing a study by the National Council on Pet Population and Policy).
241 Hart & Kidd, supra note 13, at 27.
242 Rental Housing On Line, supra n. 239 (reporting that the most often quoted fee is
$100, although the average fee is $225).
243 Id. (stating that monthly surcharges range from six to twenty-five dollars with the
monthly surcharge of fifteen dollars most often quoted).
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allowed in units, and the violation of those rules can lead to
eviction.244
Although it is difficult to determine the percentage of rental units
that allow pets, estimates range from five to fifty percent of units al-
lowing animals of some sort.245 It is also difficult to estimate the num-
ber of renters that are keeping pets in their units.246 One marketing
survey indicated that approximately fifty percent of units have some
type of companion animal (including so-called “pocket pets” and
fish).247
If a lease contains a no-pets provision, harboring a companion
animal in the building will be a violation of the lease, and the tenant,
subject to proper processes, may be evicted. The violation of no-pets
policies is “one of the most frequently violated provisions of residential
leases by tenants.”248
One legal defense to a no-pets clause is that a landlord has
“waived” the no-pets policy by allowing the open and notorious housing
of animals in the property over a period of time. Some jurisdictions
have codified this equitable waiver argument.249 New York City’s
(NYC) “Pet Law” is a well-known example of the statutory protections
available to renters in some municipalities.250
244 See e.g. W. Ridge Green Co. v. Ortiz, 1994 WL 432162 at *5 (Ohio App. 9th Dist.
1994) (providing that a manufactured home tenant’s lease properly terminated for
breach of manufactured home park’s pet regulations). In Ortiz, the tenant had a Shih-
Tzu dog that she allowed to run unattended and that she tied outside her mobile home
in violation of the park’s rules. Id. at *1. Ohio law requires that rules promulgated to
govern manufactured home lots cannot be “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” Id. at
*3 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3733.11(c) (West 2004)). The Ortiz court found that
was credible evidence that the rules were not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and
that the defendant had materially breached those rules willfully and in bad faith. Id. at
**4–5.
245 Hart & Kidd, supra n. 13, at 25–26 (estimating a number of fifty percent); Rental
Housing On Line, supra n. 239 at ¶ 2 (estimating that only five percent of rental hous-
ing allows pets, and citing to a Humane Society of the United States report that 49.4%
of U.S. renters have pets).
246 David Carrigg, Rental Properties Going to Dogs, available at http://
www.vancourier.com/issues01/07401/news/074101nn6.html (accessed Mar. 12, 2005)
(discussing tenants who hide pets to avoid confrontations with landlords).
247 Hart & Kidd, supra n. 13, at 25 (citing to survey that 49.8% of all rental units
have companion animals); see also AVMA, supra n. 3, at 48 (reporting that the percent-
age of pet-owning households that rent decreased from 49.8% in 1991 to 46.7% in 2001).
In comparison, the percentage of pet-owning households that own their home (which
may be a condominium or other common interest development) was 60.7% in 1991 and
58.7% in 2001. Id. at 48. Only 34.7% of apartment dwellers owned pets. Id.
248 George M. Heymann, Animals in the Apartment: A Landlord’s Pet Peeve, N.Y.
Law J. at 1 (Sept. 29, 1999).
249 See e.g. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2009.1(b) (2003) (New York City’s provision pro-
viding for waiver of no-pets clause for tenants harboring pets “openly and notoriously
for . . . three months or more . . . .”); see also Watts, supra n. 239 (noting that “if the
lease does include a no-pets clause, there may be local laws that can supercede . . . .”)
250 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2009.1 (West 2003). The application of the NYC Pet Law
to condominiums is dependent on where the condominium is located. Heymann, supra
n. 248, at 1. There is a split of opinion in Appellate Department decisions on this mat-
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The NYC Pet Law’s legislative declaration states that the enforce-
ment of no-pet provisions led to widespread abuses by building owners
and agents who seek to evict tenants for reasons unrelated to the
pet.251 The declaration recognizes that household pets are “kept for
reasons of safety and companionship.”252 The NYC Pet Law provides
that if a tenant harbors a pet (1) open and notoriously, (2) the owner or
his or her agent has knowledge of that fact, and (3) the owner or agent
does not commence proceeding to enforce the lease provision within
three months, then (4) the lease provision shall be deemed waived.253
Although statutory provisions like the NYC Pet Law are useful, dis-
putes over the application of the law still arise.254
Another issue raised in connection with no-pets provisions is the
inclusion of such a clause in renewal leases. The ability to alter lease
provisions will be governed by state law and may be restricted to only
reasonable changes. A case frequently cited in this area is the New
Jersey case of Young v. Savinon.255 In Young, a purchaser of an apart-
ment building attempted to impose a no-pets provision in renewal
leases.256 The New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act limits the permissible
causes for eviction and requires that lease provisions and any changes
be reasonable.257 The Young court considered whether a prohibition on
ter. Id. Tenants in cooperatively owned apartments are protected by the Pet Law. Id.
See infra n. 267 (distinguishing between condominiums and cooperatives).
251 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2009.1(a) (West 2003). The Westchester County Code
provision sets out some of those reasons, such as facilitating a condominium conversion,
garnering a larger monthly rental with a new tenant, and discouraging tenants from
enforcing their rights. Westchester County Code § 695.01 (2000); Delta Socy., The Legal
Ins and Outs of Pet Ownership and Housing, http://www.deltasociety.org/dsz101.htm
(accessed Nov. 4, 2004).
252 N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 27-2009.1(a).
253 Id. at § 27-2009.1(b). The waiver provision of the statute specifically does not ap-
ply if the harboring of the “pet causes damage to the subject premises, creates a nui-
sance or interferes substantially with the health, safety or welfare of other tenants or
occupants of the same or adjacent building or structure.” Id. at § 27-2009.1(d).
254 Heymann, supra n. 248, at 1 (analyzing cases relating to the Pet Law including
what type of knowledge the owner or agent must have in order for the waiver provision
to apply). Another example of the type of dispute that may arise is the application of the
law to a replacement pet. Park Holding Co. v. Emicke, 646 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (N.Y. App.
Term 1st Dept. 1996) (holding that a prior waiver will not prevent a landlord from ob-
jecting to the presence of a replacement pet); see also Defeo v. Carmody, 689 N.Y.S.2d
862, 864 (N.Y.C. Ct., Mt. Vernon 1999) (interpreting the Westchester County Code pro-
vision, which is virtually identical to the NYC Pet Law, that a landlord did not waive
his right to object to a new dog, although in this case the landlord failed to timely object
to a new animal). There have been efforts to change the NYC Pet Law to provide more
certainty in its application and to allow anyone sixty-two or older to have a pet regard-
less of a no-pet clause. Amy Sacks, Pet Owners on Short Leash, N.Y. Daily News 16
(Sept. 27, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 58603259) (discussing proposed changes to NYC
Pet Law).
255 492 A.2d 385 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1985).
256 Id. at 387. The previous owner had imposed no prohibition on pets. Id. The new
landlord admitted “purchasing the premises with the intention of forcing the tenants
either to get rid of their pets or move.” Id.
257 Id. at 388 (citing to N.J. Stat Ann. § 2A:18–61.1 (West Supp. 2003)).
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pets “shall operate retroactively to force the removal of pets already
owned by tenants in a situation where there was no lease violation
when the pets were acquired.”258 The Young court found that, to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the prohibition, the circumstances of both
the landlord and tenant should be considered.259
The tenant defendants in Young presented testimony by a special-
ist on the influence of companion animals on the mental and physical
health of their owners.260 The expert testimony established
that the loss of their pets . . . would cause significant health problems, espe-
cially if the loss is due to a defendant being forced to give up his or her pet
as opposed to the pet’s dying a natural death. Defendants could be expected
to suffer grief and depression as great as that suffered at the loss of a fam-
ily member and, in addition, suffer from a sense of guilt and loss of self-
esteem.261
The expert also cited to studies showing the positive impact of pets
on human health and testified to specific negative consequences that
could be expected if the tenants were forced to give up their ani-
mals.262 Given the unimpeached testimony concerning the bonding be-
tween the tenants and their dogs, and the adverse effect to the tenants
if the provision were to be enforced, the court found that it would be
unreasonable to enforce the no-pets provision with respect to the te-
nants and their current pets.263
Obviously, Young illustrates a progressive attitude about the role
of companion animals in the lives of their owners, with the allowance
of expert testimony and providing for a balancing of interests. Most
renters will need to continue to search for the limited number of pet-
friendly premises in order to ensure that they will be able to keep their
companion animals in their lives.
258 Id. at 389.
259 492 A.2d at 389.
260 Id. at 387. The expert was Dr. Aaron Katcher. See supra nn. 6, 8 for work by Dr.
Katcher.
261 Young, 492 A.2d at 387.
262 Id. at 387–88. The Young court reported that the testimony established that “the
presence of pets generally lowers the rate of mortality.” Id. at 388.
263 Id. at 389–90. The three dogs at issue were all at least twelve years old and none
of the dogs had been subject to any but “the most minor complaint.” Id. at 387. Testi-
mony also established that there was some criminal activity in the area. Id. Tenants,
including those without pets, “testified that the presence of the dogs [makes them] feel
safer, since [the dogs] give warning when strangers approach.” Young, 492 A.2d at 387.
The Young court also set forth the general rule regarding no-pets provisions, stating
that
Such provisions have been found reasonable from a landlord’s point of view and
should be enforced unless the landlord has expressly or impliedly permitted par-
ticular pets to be maintained, is otherwise estopped from enforcing the provision,
or if a tenant who had previously been allowed to maintain a pet upon the prem-
ises can show that it is unreasonable to enforce the provision under the particular
circumstances of the case before the court.
Id. at 390.
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One way to support the ability of tenants to keep pets in rental
premises is to support and expand the educational efforts being made
by humane societies and other organizations that understand the ben-
efits of responsible pet ownership.264 Laws that prevent the inequita-
ble eviction of tenants with animals also enable responsible owners to
retain their rental housing.265
B. Condominiums
Even if one is fortunate enough to have the financial means to own
real property, restrictions on pet ownership do not disappear.266 In
fact, depending on the type of property one owns, the problems may be
very similar. An example is the restriction of pets in condominium or
cooperative housing developments.267 There are many types of housing
developments; however, the focus of this section of the article will be
on condominiums.268
Condominium refers to a form of ownership in a multi-unit devel-
opment “in which a person has both separate ownership of a unit and
[an] . . . interest . . . in the common areas.”269 Every state has its own
condominium statute.270 Use restrictions, such as keeping an animal
264 See Swartz, supra n. 238 (discussing one organization’s educational efforts); Delta
Socy., The Legal Ins and Outs of Pet Ownership and Housing, http://
www.deltasociety.org/dsz101.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (offering some guidance to
pet owners regarding housing issues).
265 See supra nn. 249–54 and accompanying text (discussing local laws that codify the
circumstances under which a tenant may keep an animal in rental housing despite a no-
pets clause in his or her lease).
266 See generally APPMA, supra n. 1, at xxxvi (“More pet owners own their own home
than the total U.S. population (especially dog and cat owners).”).
267 Cooperative developments are common in New York City and the East Coast,
with the condominium structure more common elsewhere. Stewart E. Sterk, Minority
Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 273, 276 (1997); see Park
Village West Assoc., Inc. v. Sugar, 1999 WL 1441926 at *4 (Mass. Super. 1999) (discuss-
ing the distinction between condominiums and cooperative associations in a case involv-
ing the change of a house rule prohibiting any new dogs). Sugar illustrates the
importance of recording documents (although the court makes it clear that house rules
of a cooperative do not need to be recorded) and notice of rule changes. Id.
268 Wayne S. Hyatt, Condominium and Homeowner Association Practice: Community
Association Law, 13–19 (3d ed. Am. L. Inst. 2000) (discussing types of developments).
Another form of development that is sometimes confused with a condominium is a coop-
erative. In a cooperative (or co-op), a corporation owns all the real estate and issues
shares and leases to its shareholders. Id. at 14. Under this system the shareholder-
tenants are entitled to exclusive possession of their individual units. Id. This article will
also discuss issues relating to subdivisions and municipal ordinances. See infra pt.
IV(A). According to the Community Associations Institute, there were an estimated
249,000 community associations in the United States at the end of 2003, with planned
communities accounting for 50–55% of these associations, condominiums for 40–45%,
and cooperatives for 5–7%. Community Associations Institute, Data on U.S. Community
Associations, http://www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (accessed Oct. 10, 2004).
269 Black’s Law Dictionary 291 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. West 1999). Use of the
condominium form of development did not become widespread until after 1961 when
mortgage and title insurance became available.
270 Hyatt, supra n. 268, at 11.
104 ANIMAL LAW [Vol. 11:69
in a unit, can be included in several documents that govern the condo-
minium.271 Of these documents, the “Declaration” is drafted and re-
corded by the developer prior to the sale of any individual unit.272
Other documents include bylaws that govern the condominium associ-
ation, and a separate set of rules for the development owner.273 In gen-
eral, “[courts] are far more likely to enforce use restrictions that
appear in the recorded Declaration than they are to enforce restric-
tions imposed by subsequent vote of the association’s board.”274
Pet provisions are the “most frequently litigated of lifestyle re-
strictions” in these type of developments.275 Whether a restriction on
keeping a pet will be valid is often dependent on when and how the
prohibition was put in place. If the prohibition is contained in a Decla-
ration or bylaws, there is “nearly universal agreement” that the prohi-
bition is enforceable.276 If a Declaration expressly contemplates that
the unit owners may keep pets, the association should not be able to,
by rule, prohibit pets.277 In addition, courts are not as likely to sustain
an association’s action to prohibit pets if it seeks to apply such a prohi-
bition retroactively.278
Perhaps the most well-known of the condominium pet rules cases
is the 1994 case, Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assoc.,
Inc.279 In this Supreme Court of California case, Narhstedt moved into
271 Sterk, supra n. 267, at 277.
272 Id. Sometimes the Declaration is called the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions
and Restrictions, thus the abbreviation of CCRs (or CC&Rs) that is often used when
discussing restrictions in the Declaration. This document may also be called a “Master
Deed.” Id.
273 Id. at 277–78; see also Bd. of Dirs. of 175th E. Del. Place Homeowners Assoc. v.
Hinojosa, 679 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1997) (discussing the various docu-
ments utilized to govern condominiums).
274 Sterk, supra n. 267, at 278.
275 Id. at 340 (discussing pet restrictions along with other lifestyle restrictions).
276 Id. at 339. Another commentator agrees with this analysis as it relates to Declara-
tions. Jordan I. Shifrin, Welcome to CondoWorld! . . . Where Life is Almost Perfect 195
(iUniverse 2002). See e.g. The Pines of Boca Barwood Condo. Assoc., Inc. v. Cavouti, 605
So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1992) (finding that a pet restriction in a condomin-
ium declaration was “clothed with a strong presumption of validity” and was valid);
Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 270–271 (Mass. App. 1993) (finding that the sub-
stance of a valid pet restriction was part of the originating documents of the condomin-
ium and was incorporated into the bylaws to better accommodate future enforcement).
277 Sterk, supra n. 267, at 339 (stating that “courts have been unwilling to sustain pet
prohibitions that are inconsistent with the Declaration”).
278 Id. at 340 (discussing the retroactive application of a pet provision and the com-
mon use of “grandfather” clauses when rules are changed).
279 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994). See e.g. Carl B. Kress, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing
Restrictions Governing Life in a Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 837
(1995) (discussing the Nahrstedt case and the law of other jurisdictions); Sheri L. Mar-
vin, A Condominium Association’s Recorded and Uniformly Enforced Use Restrictions
Prohibiting Pet Ownership are Presumptively Valid and Reasonable Equitable Servi-
tudes Under Cal. Civ. Code Section 1354: Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Assoc.
Inc., 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 1692 (1995) (discussing the Nahrstedt case); Daniel R. Puter-
baugh, The Reasonable Pet: An Examination of the Enforcement of Restrictions in Cali-
fornia Common Interest Developments After Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo.
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a condominium with her three cats in violation of the project’s declara-
tion, which prohibited specified animals, including cats, from being
kept in the units.280 Narhstedt argued that the pet restriction “was
‘unreasonable’ as applied to her because she kept her three cats in-
doors and because her cats were ‘noiseless’ and ‘created no
nuisance.’”281
The California Supreme Court provided background on condomin-
iums generally, as well as the role of use restrictions.282 The Narhstedt
court cited to several cases that upheld pet restrictions.283 California
has specific legislative language that provides that use restrictions
contained in a recorded declaration will be enforceable unless
unreasonable.284
The court’s analysis of this statutory language resulted in the fol-
lowing test to determine whether a restriction should be enforced:
“such restrictions should be enforced unless they are wholly arbitrary,
violate a fundamental public policy, or impose a burden on the use of
affected land that far outweighs any benefit.”285 The Nahrstedt court
elaborated by stating that “the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
a condominium use restriction . . . is to be determined not by reference
to facts that are specific to the objecting homeowner, but by reference
to the common interest development as a whole.”286 The court con-
cluded as a matter of law that the restriction at issue “is not arbitrary,
but is rationally related to health, sanitation and noise concerns legiti-
mately held by residents of . . . Lakeside Village.”287
Assoc., Inc., 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 793 (1996) (discussing the Nahrstedt case and con-
dominium law in California); see also Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: In-
vasion of the Castle Domain, 23 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1995) (Extrapolating from his dissent
in Nahrstedt, Justice Arabian discusses some of the critical concerns from its holding
and proposes model legislation designed to protect individual property owners.).
280 Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1278. The pet restriction stated “[n]o animals (which shall
mean dogs and cats), livestock, reptiles or poultry shall be kept in any unit.” Id.
281 Id. Nahrstedt’s cats were kept indoors. Id. The court of appeals “concluded that
the homeowners association could enforce the restriction only upon proof the plaintiff’s
cats would be likely to interfere with the right of other homeowners ‘to the peaceful and
quiet enjoyment of their property.’” Id.
282 Id. at 1280–81. “Use restrictions are an inherent part of many common interest
developments and are crucial to the stable, planned environment of any shared owner-
ship arrangement.” Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1281.
283 Id.
284 Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 1354(a) (West 2004). The Nahrstedt court continued by stat-
ing “[in] states lacking such legislative guidance, some courts have adopted a standard
under which . . . recorded use restrictions will be enforced so long as they are ‘reasona-
ble.’” Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1283. The court then continued its analysis by considering
the various ways that “reasonable” had been interpreted by several courts outside of
California. Id. at 1283–84.
285 Id. at 1287.
286 Id. at 1290 (emphasis in original).
287 Id. The California Supreme Court found “no fundamental public policy that would
favor the keeping of pets in a condominium project.” Id. at 1291. The court continued by
stating that there was no California statute that conferred a general right to keep pets
in a condominium and footnoted the California provision that allows disabled individu-
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Although Nahrstedt is notable for its comprehensive review of con-
dominium law and restrictive use provisions, it is also frequently cited
because of the dissenting opinion and the aftermath of the decision.
The dissenting opinion provided an eloquent discussion of the role pets
play in the lives of their human caretakers.288 Justice Arabian found
the pet restriction patently arbitrary and unreasonable and stated
that the provision “does not promote ‘health, happiness [or] peace of
mind’ commensurate with its tariff on the quality of life for those who
value the companionship of animals. Worse, it contributes to the fray-
ing of our social fabric.”289 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Arabian
cited to historical and cultural references along with sources that es-
tablish the benefits of animal companionship.290 As to the aftermath of
the decision, one commentator states that “[partially] in response to
Nahrstedt,”291 the California civil code was amended to provide that at
least one pet per single interest may be kept in a common interest de-
velopment (or mobile home park) where the development’s governing
documents were entered into or amended on or after January 1,
2001.292
In addition to the California approach of whether the restriction is
“unreasonable,” other courts have analyzed these types of restrictions
under a “reasonableness” standard, or utilizing a “business judgment
rule,” as well as mixtures of the two.293 Justice Arabian believes that
all the standards of review substantially limit individual
challenges.294
At least in some jurisdictions, it may be possible for a condomin-
ium board to promulgate a rule restricting pet ownership.295 In Board
als and the elderly to keep pets in publicly funded housing. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1291,
n. 12.
288 Id. at 1292–97.
289 Id. at 1293.
290 Id. at 1294–95.
291 John Paul Hanna & David M. Van Atta, California Common Interest Develop-
ments: Law and Practice § 22.62 (West 2003).
292 Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§1360.5, 798.33 (West 2002) (mandating pet ownership in
common interest developments and mobile home parks respectively); see also Villa de
las Palmas Homeowners Assoc. v. Terifaj, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 780 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
2002), petition for review granted, 55 P.3d 36 (Cal. 2002) (court of appeals upheld a No-
Pets rule citing to the Nahrstedt case) (aff’d, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 67 (Cal. 2004)).
293 Arabian, supra n. 279, at 11–18 (discussing the Florida reasonableness standard
and the New York Business Judgment Rule as well as other standards of review);
Kress, supra n. 279, at 842–69 (discussing California law and the law of other
jurisdictions).
294 Arabian, supra n. 279, at 18.
295 Hinojosa, 679 N.E.2d at 409 (stating that the issue of whether the Board may
promulgate a rule restricting dog ownership was an issue of first impression in the state
of Illinois); but see Brookside Condo. Trust v. Zuliani, 1999 WL 1331233 at *3 (Mass.
Super. Feb. 18, 1999) (finding that a condominium’s “prohibition against keeping dogs
in the condominium units if found only in the Rules and Regulations, which by statute
may govern conduct only in common areas and facilities, not in individual units . . . as
such, cannot be enforced to prohibit the keeping of a dog within an individual condomin-
ium unit”).
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of Directors of 175th East Delaware Place Homeowners Assn. v. Hi-
nojosa, an Illinois appellate court considered whether a board could
promulgate a rule that restricted dog ownership.296 The court recog-
nized that rules promulgated by boards are not “clothed with a strong
presumption of validity,”297 and would require affirmative proof that
the rule is reasonable in its purpose and application.298 The Hinojosa
court considered the specific facts surrounding the case, in addition to
a Maryland case that barred pets by house rules that included “poten-
tially offensive odors, noise, possible health hazards, clean-up and
maintenance problems.”299 The building at issue in Hinojosa was a
high-rise with the residences on the fourty-fifth to ninety-second
floors, located in a densely populated area where recreational areas for
dogs were scarce.300 The board had utilized less restrictive measures
to regulate dogs previously, but those measures did not alleviate the
potential and real problems it perceived.301 The Hinojosa court con-
cluded that the rule was reasonable under the specific facts of the
case.302
In addition to litigation over the placement and adoption of pet
restrictions, unit holders fighting the enforcement of a restriction may
argue that there has been arbitrary application, selective enforcement,
waiver,303 changed conditions, estoppel,304 or that the statute of limi-
tations has run.305
An example of selective enforcement is a recent Florida case
where a condominium association brought an action seeking an injunc-
296 Hinojosa, 679 N.E.2d at 411.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id. (citing to Dulaney Towers Maint. Corp. v. O’Brey, 418 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Md.
Spec. App. 1980)).
300 Id.
301 Id. The Hinojosa court noted that the new rule only prohibited additional or re-
placement dogs; existing dogs were allowed. Hinojosa, 679 N.E.2d at 411.
302 Id. The court also noted that the rule was applied to all owners and had a rational
purpose. Id.
303 See e.g. Dice v. Inwood Hills Condo., 237 A.D.2d 403, 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept.
1997) (finding it was a factual issue as to whether the No-Pets provision of regulations
had been waived); but see Northwoods Condo. Owners’ Assn. v. Arnold, 770 N.E.2d 627,
630 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 2002) (holding that a unit holder’s assent to purchase with
actual knowledge of a pet provision waived any right to raise the defense that the provi-
sion was illegally adopted).
304 See e.g. Jefferson Place Condo. Assn. v. Naples, 708 N.E.2d 771, 776–77 (Ohio Ct.
App. 7th Dist. 1998) (finding that a condominium association would be equitably es-
topped from enforcing an animal restriction against a unit owner who reasonably relied
on representations that pets were allowed in the units), appeal not allowed, 692 N.E.2d
1027 (Ohio 1998).
305 Pond Apple Place III Condo. Assn., Inc. v. Russo, 841 So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. 4th
Dist. App. 2003) (discussing the applicable statute of limitations in a case where a con-
dominium association brought suit to enforce a restrictive covenant prohibiting dogs in
the units); see generally Hyatt, supra n. 268, at 163–68.
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tion to bar a resident from keeping a dog on the premises.306 In Prisco
v. Forest Villas Condominium Apartments, Inc., an appellate court
found that a resident was entitled to raise the affirmative defense of
selective enforcement of a covenant when a condominium association
allowed cats but not dogs, despite a prohibition in the declaration
against pets other than fish or birds.307
From the perspective of an association that wishes to keep pets
out, one practitioner cites the following to ensure successful applica-
tion of the restriction:308
1. If a change in policy is necessary, amendment of the declaration is pre-
ferred over a modification of rules or regulations;309
2. The rules should define the term “pet,” and should set out remedies
and procedures for any violation;310
3. Pet regulations should be enforced consistently, uniformly, and
fairly;311
4. If applicable, local codes or ordinances can be utilized to buttress a case
against a problem unit holder.312
One way to encourage the allowance of companion animals in com-
mon interest developments is to support the passage of legislation sim-
ilar to the California provisions that limit the ability to prohibit pets in
this type of housing. Over time, more judges may be convinced of the
value animals can play in the lives of their human companions, and,
instead of a dissenting opinion,313 the majority of a court may inter-
pret the law in a way that recognizes the importance of these animals.
In the short term, it is important for persons purchasing units in con-
dominiums to pay close attention not only to the current restrictions in
the governing documents, but also the process for change to make cer-
306 Prisco v. Forest Villas Condo. Apts., Inc., 847 So. 2d 1012, 1012 (Fla. 4th Dist.
App. 2003).
307 Id. at 1015.
308 Shifrin, supra n. 276, at 195–98 (discussing the problem of careless pet owners).
Shifrin states that “[t]he most effective way of dealing with irresponsible pet owners is
to have tough rules and regulations and strict enforcement procedures.” Id. at 198.
309 Id. at 195–96. Amendment of the declaration, while more difficult, may be less
problematic in the long run due to increased odds of litigation if rules and regulations
alone are modified. Id. at 195. In addition, Shifrin states that “most appellate court
decisions addressing pet restrictions have imposed the requirement of using grandfa-
ther clauses for pet amendments, where the owner can keep the pet until it dies or the
unit is sold.” Id. at 196.
310 Id. at 197. Shifrin recommends the specification of any types of animals not al-
lowed, as well as clear standards if there are any size or behavioral restrictions. Shifrin,
supra n. 276, at 197.
311 Id. at 196. Shifrin discusses the role of owners in reporting violations and the
need for detailed complaints. Shifrin also discourages the imposition of rules, such as
pet deposits, being applied in a discriminatory fashion between tenants and unit hold-
ers. Id.
312 Id. at 198. Shifrin recommends the consideration of any other local ordinances
before a hearing is conducted. Id.
313 Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1292–97.
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tain that their expectations regarding pet ownership continue to be
met.314
IV. LOCAL LAWS
A. Municipal Ordinances and Restrictive Covenants
Municipalities have passed different types of ordinances to try to
regulate companion animals. Statutes that relate to the regulation of
companion animals have been contested frequently, but such lawsuits
have generally been unsuccessful.315 Historically, mandatory registra-
tion (licensing) programs have been more commonly applied to dogs
than cats.316 An estimated ninety percent of cities and counties have
had a dog registration program.317 The justifications for animal licens-
ing laws vary by jurisdiction, but many times the proceeds support the
funding of shelters, vaccination enforcement, and educational pro-
grams.318 If an animal is licensed, enforcement agencies are able to
identify and reunite lost companion animals with their owners.319
Some ordinances require that animals wear tags or be implanted with
microchips in addition to or instead of registration.320 Studies on
mandatory registration programs for cats show that licensing-plus-
identification programs increase the number of cats that are returned
to their owners.321
314 See Patrick A. Randolph, Changing the Rules: Should Courts Limit the Power of
Common Interest Communities to Alter Unit Owners’ Privileges in the Face of Vested
Expectations? 38 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1081, 1097–102 (1998) (analyzing whether per-
sons in common interest communities have a legally enforceable expectation that cer-
tain aspects of the community will not change without their consent and citing to the
few cases considering the pet issue).
315 Soave, supra n. 18, at 164; see also Nicchia v. N.Y., 254 U.S. 228, 231 (1920) (find-
ing that there is no infringement of the U.S. Constitution, specifically of the Fourteenth
Amendment, if a state statute requires the licensing of a dog); David Favre & Peter L.
Borchelt, Animal Law and Dog Behavior 197 (Laws. & JJ. Publg. Co., Inc. 1999) (noting
that a law that is rationally related to an appropriate public health, safety, and welfare
interest must violate a citizen’s constitutional right to be set aside); see e.g. Holt v. City
of Sauk Rapids, 559 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. App. 1997) (upholding ordinance that lim-
ited the number of dogs that could be kept on residential premises); Prof. Houndsmen of
Mo., Inc. v. County of Boone, 836 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. App. W. Dist. 1992) (finding that
an animal control ordinance with registration, vaccination, and control provisions was
valid).
316 Humane Socy. of the U.S., Guide to Cat Law: A Guide for Legislators and Humane
Advocates, 3 (Humane Society of the U.S. 2002) [hereinafter Guide to Cat Law].
317 Id. at 3.
318 Wilson, supra n. 21, at 79.
319 Id.; see also Huss, Separation, supra n. 2, at 211–20 (discussing the issue of lost
animals).
320 Guide to Cat Law, supra n. 316, at 3–4; see also Huss, Separation, supra n. 2, at
204 n. 153 (discussing “microchipping” of companion animals).
321 Guide to Cat Law, supra n. 316, at 3 (citing to a return-to-owner rate increase
from 0.9% (in 1995) to 4% (in 2002) after an ordinance requiring that cats wear identifi-
cation or be “microchipped” was enacted in Oahu, Hawaii).
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Vaccination requirements are also quite common, with most
states requiring periodic rabies vaccinations for dogs,322 and a number
of states requiring rabies vaccinations for cats as well.323 Confinement
and control of animals is justified by the need to control diseases or to
prevent animals from becoming nuisances or injuring people.324
Due to the threat to the public from dog bites, beginning in the
late 1970s, a number of jurisdictions adopted statutes covering danger-
ous dogs.325 Courts have consistently upheld the language of well-writ-
ten dangerous dog statutes as a legitimate exercise of the jurisdiction’s
police power.326 The “bite” issue, as it relates to housing, is discussed
322 Wilson, supra n. 21, at 79. The justification for mandatory rabies vaccinations is
the public health threat to humans as well as animals. Id. “The widespread vaccination
of dogs in the United States has reduced the number of cases of rabies in dogs from
6,949 in 1947 to 114 in 2000.” Guide to Cat Law, supra n. 316, at 6.
323 Guide to Cat Law, supra n. 316, at 6. “Today more cats than dogs succumb to
[rabies] . . . . [A]s of 2001, twenty-five states mandated rabies vaccination of cats and an
additional thirteen required local jurisdictions to vaccinate cats against rabies.” Id.
324 Soave, supra n. 18, at 164. Provisions that set specific standards as to the care or
treatment of animals are becoming more common in municipal ordinances. See e.g. Re-
nee Koury, Coming in from the Cold; Advocate Promoting Indoor Homes for Dogs, San
Jose Mercury News 1 (Dec. 1, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 69054153) (discussing the
adoption of anti-tethering ordinances in eight U.S. cities).
325 Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 202–06; see also Christopher C. Eck & Robert
E. Bovett, Oregon Dog Control Laws and Due Process: A Case Study, 4 Animal L. 95
(1998) (discussing Oregon dog control laws that require the impounding and euthanasia
of any dog found to be chasing injuring or killing livestock); Favre & Borchelt, supra n.
315, at 208–10 (discussing statutory provisions covering dogs and other animals worry-
ing or harassing livestock).
326 Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 202–06. Generally, the application of a danger-
ous dog statute requires that a dog first be identified as being a danger to the public—
due to the dog biting or attacking a person or other animal. Id. at 203. Normally the
action taken by the dog must be unprovoked. Id. Statutes have also been passed classi-
fying certain breeds of dogs, usually pit bulls or pit bull mixes, as being naturally dan-
gerous. Soave, supra n. 18, at 176–78. The identification of the dog as dangerous causes
the possession by the owner to become conditional—sometimes subject to keeping the
dog confined or on leash at all times, as well as providing proof of minimum insurance
coverage if the dog causes injuries. Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 203; Soave, supra
n. 18, at 176. If the owner does not follow the strict provisions of the law, or if the dog
causes injury, there can be criminal sanctions against the owner as well as seizure of
the animal. Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 202–06. Some statutes make it extremely
difficult to regain custody of an animal once it has been confiscated. Id. These statutory
provisions vary but may require the posting of a bond and paying the costs for the
animal’s care while the animal is held. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:8(IV) (West Supp.
2003) (providing for the posting of a $2,000 bond and for costs to be assessed for the care
of the animal); see also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.50(3) (West 2003) (providing hear-
ing prior to forfeiture of animals unless cash or security is submitted to cover the costs
of care from initial impoundment to trial); N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law §§ 118, 373 (McKin-
ney 2004) (creating process for notification to owner of identified dog, and posting of
security in case of person charged with cruelty to cover the costs of the animals’ care
prior to the adjudication of the charges); see also e.g. Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301,
306–07 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that the owner of horses had a due process right to
notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the permanent termination of his inter-
est in the horses). The ultimate penalty for the dog that has caused harm is the eutha-
nasia of the dog. Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 203. The state has clear authority to
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briefly below.327
A restriction that may be in the form of a municipal ordinance or a
restrictive covenant in a subdivision is one that that limits the type
and number of animals that can be kept by each resident.328 Ordi-
nances with these types of limits serve several purposes. One is to
maintain a common scheme of development—as with any other type of
restrictive covenant. Oftentimes this purpose is raised when the type
of animal the property owner wishes to keep is unusual.329
One benefit of this type of ordinance is that it provides a tool for
governments to resolve animal hoarding cases. “Animal hoarders are
individuals who accumulate so many animals (in the dozens or even
hundreds) that they are unable to provide even minimal standards of
nutrition, sanitation and veterinary care.”330 With an ordinance that
limits the number of animals, officials may be able to remove animals
from the property without first having to prove animal cruelty.331 Lim-
itations on the type or number of animals can also be used to deal with
possible nuisance problems.332
kill a dangerous dog. Id. The constitutionality of some breed-specific statutes has been
successfully challenged. Lynn Marmer, The New Breed of Municipal Dog Control Laws:
Are They Constitutional? 53 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1067 (1984) (discussing the enactment and
constitutionality of pit bull regulations).
327 See infra pt. IV(E) (discussing the problem of injuries caused to humans by com-
panion animals).
328 There are many restrictions on keeping exotic or wild animals in state and local
law. Challenges to these types of restrictions utilize a similar analysis as the statutes
discussed herein. See e.g. Kent v. Polk Co. Bd. of Supervisors, 391 N.W.2d 220, 227
(Iowa 1986) (finding that a county ordinance regulating possession of dangerous and
vicious animals was a valid exercise of police power and did not constitute a taking in a
case where a property owner was keeping a lion as a pet); Town of Grant v. Johnson,
1993 WL 231683, *1 (Minn. App. June 29, 1993) (citing to the town’s police power to
uphold an ordinance prohibiting the keeping of wild animals without a permit); Peoples
Program for Endangered Species v. Sexton, 476 S.E.2d 477, 481 (S.C. 1996) (finding that
ordinance that classified wolves as wild animals did not violate property owners’ equal
protection rights); Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground, 114 Wash. App. 1062, 1062–63
(Wash. App. Div. 2 2002) (upholding order dismissing constitutional challenges to an
ordinance that prohibits ownership of exotic animals within city limits utilizing the ra-
tional basis test). As this article deals with companion animals, these restrictions on
exotic animals will not be discussed further. Note that potbellied pigs and horses are
now considered companion animals by some people. See infra nn. 408–54 and accompa-
nying text for cases dealing with these animals. Subdivisions also have covenants that
restrict the number and type of animals. See e.g. Turudic v. Stephens, 31 P.3d 465, 472
(Or. App. 2001) (discussing whether a covenant prohibited the keeping of a cougar or
the cougar’s pen).
329 See infra nn. 408–54 (discussing cases wherein potbellied pigs and horses are at
issue).
330 Guide to Cat Law, supra n. 316, at 11. Animal hoarders frequently do not recog-
nize that the animals are suffering. Id.
331 Id.; see also Combat Animal Hoarding, Providence J. (R.I.) B06 (Aug. 11, 2003)
(available at 2003 WL 57184868) (discussing the problem of animal hoarding).
332 Guide to Cat Law, supra n. 316, at 11; see e.g. Commonwealth v. Creighton, 639
A.2d 1296, 1299–1300 (Pa. Commw. 1994) (illustrating the interaction of an ordinance
limiting the number of cats and dogs to five per residence and a nuisance claim). Note
that the Creighton court found it necessary to remand the case to the trial court to
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An example of the flexibility a municipality has in drafting its or-
dinances is City of Marion v. Schoenwald.333 At issue in this Supreme
Court of South Dakota case was a city ordinance that limited house-
holds to four dogs, only two of which could weigh over twenty-five
pounds.334 Schoenwald owned three dogs which were properly licensed
and vaccinated in June, 1999.335 At the time of licensing, one of the
dogs weighed twenty pounds.336 In February 2000, Schoenwald was
notified that she was in violation of the ordinance by housing three
dogs weighing over twenty-five pounds.337 The Schoenwald court
stated it was “not clear from the record how the City determined that
Schoenwald’s third dog had subsequently exceeded the weight limita-
tion.”338 After a second notice, she was issued a citation.339 At trial,
Schoenwald argued that the ordinance exceeded the scope of municipal
authority and was unconstitutional under the South Dakota
Constitution.340
The South Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by discuss-
ing the authority under which cities may regulate.341 If there is not
inherent authority, the right of cities to regulate is derived from the
legislature, which delegates “a large measure of police power to munic-
ipal corporations, either expressly or inferentially.”342 The Court noted
its own history “of not interfering with municipal governments unless
their actions are palpably arbitrary, unreasonable, or beyond their au-
thority.”343 The only specific enabling statute in the state code dealt
with prohibiting, regulating, licensing, and dogs running at large.344
Moreover, “[a] broader power to regulate in this area stems from mu-
determine the goals of the ordinance and to determine whether the goals were legiti-
mate and the means used to achieve them were reasonable. Id. at 1301.
333 631 N.W.2d 213 (S.D. 2001).
334 Id. at 215. The ordinance provides that each home was restricted to having no
more than four dogs and four adult cats. Id.
335 Id. At the time of the licensing, the dogs weighed the following: shepherd-collie
(seventy-five pounds), male golden retriever (thirty pounds), and female golden re-
triever (twenty pounds). Id. Diane Schoenwald was married with three children. Id.
Diane was issued the citation; however, the record indicates that while the dogs may
have been owned by Diane for purposes of licensing, they were considered the family’s
dogs. Schoenwald, 631 N.W.2d at 215.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 215 n. 2
339 Id. at 215.
340 Id. at 215–16. The magistrate granted Schoenwald’s dismissal motion, and the
City of Marion requested discretionary review. Schoenwald, 631 N.W.2d at 216.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id. The Schoenwald court continued by stating “[w]e also presume that cities are
familiar with their local conditions and know their own needs; therefore we will not
substitute our judgment for their decisions, unless they abuse their power.” Id. at 217.
344 Id. at 217. The Schoenwald court considered the enactments’ legislative intent;
finding that the legislative intent was to leave subjects like pet control to local govern-
ments. Schoenwald, 631 N.W.2d at 217.
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nicipal authority to maintain the health, safety, and general welfare of
the community and the right to abate nuisances.”345
In almost all jurisdictions, “municipal power to regulate animals
kept as pets is broadly construed. . . . and [restrictions] on the aggre-
gate number of dogs in households are commonly upheld against con-
stitutional attacks.”346 The City of Marion cited to no animal science
authority that supported a weight threshold and to no other case in
which a similar weight restriction was upheld.347 Notwithstanding
concerns regarding the weight restrictions (specifically, that compli-
ance with the ordinance may fluctuate) the South Dakota Supreme
Court upheld the ordinance, citing to a rule of statutory construction
that the enactment should be read as a whole.348 The Schoenwald
court found that “larger dogs have a greater potential for harm” and
that the “limit on the number of dogs assuredly advances public wel-
fare.”349 The weight limit, read together with the ability to possess
four dogs, was “sufficiently related to the purpose of protecting public
health and safety; thus it did not unreasonably exceed the City’s regu-
latory authority.”350
Ordinances may limit the number of pets kept on property based
on the type of housing. Village of Carpentersville v. Fiala illustrates
this concept.351 The ordinance in question provides “[n]o person shall
permit more than two dogs to be or remain in or about any single-
family residence, building[,] or lot, or more than one dog in any single-
family unit in any multiple housing building . . . .”352 The Illinois ap-
pellate court considered whether the classifications contained in the
ordinance violated equal protection.353 It found that the classifications
in the ordinance were not “suspect classifications” and did not involve
“fundamental interests,” so the rational basis test would be applica-
ble.354 The analysis continued with a finding that, although individu-
345 Id. “Regulation of specific breeds is also considered a proper exercise of police
power.” Id. (citations omitted).
346 Id. (citation omitted).
347 Id. at 218.
348 Id.
349 Schoenwald, 631 N.W.2d at 218. The South Dakota Supreme Court found that the
“ordinance is an attempt to balance competing needs, public and private.” Id.
350 Id. The Schoenwald court also found a “rational relationship between the ordi-
nance and the problems caused by large dogs,” so there was no violation of the South
Dakota Constitution. Id.
351 425 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1981).
352 Id. at 34 (citing to Section 14-23 of the Village Code). The Village of Carpenter-
sville has the same restrictions in its current Village Code. Village of Carpentersville,
Ill., New Resident Information, “Important Village Code Summaries: Limitation as to
Number of Dogs to Be Kept,” http://vil.carpentersville.il.us/resident.htm (accessed Nov.
4, 2004).
353 Fiala, 425 N.E.2d at 35. The Fiala court also considered and rejected the argu-
ment that there was not statutory authority for the enactment of the ordinance. Id.
354 Id. “Suspect classifications” include sex, race, alienage, or national origin. Id.
“Fundamental interests” include the right to travel freely or practice a religion. Id. For
a classification “to be constitutional in the sense of equal protection, [it] must be based
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als have a privilege to use property freely, this “is subject always to a
legitimate exercise of the police power under which new burdens and
restrictions may be imposed when the public welfare demands.”355
The Fiala court noted that, “[w]ith regard to the keeping of dogs,
we believe there are real and substantial differences between single-
family residences and single-family units within multiple housing
buildings.”356 The differences cited include “considerations of indoor
and outdoor space, density and proximity to others, noise levels and
structural differences.”357 The court found that the difference articu-
lated by the statute between single-family and multi-family housing
buildings was rationally related to the object of the ordinance and not
violative of equal protection.358
It is necessary for municipal ordinances to meet general statutory
constructs. For example, in Foster v. State, the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia found a county ordinance unconstitutionally vague.359 The ordi-
nance provided in part:
It shall be unlawful for there to be more than four dogs and/or cats on any
residential lot that is less than five acres in size, subject to the following
exceptions: (1) Animal owners who have an approved permit issued by the
animal control board shall be excepted from this section.360
The absence of ascertainable standards to grant or deny the per-
mit gave the board uncontrolled discretion which was “incompatible
with the requirements of due process.”361
As illustrated by Schoenwald, amending and enforcing municipal
ordinances relating to companion animals can be quite controversial
and can lead to litigation.362 Municipalities wishing to limit the type
on some real and substantial difference in persons and bear a rational relation to the
purposes of the statute.” Id.
355 Fiala, 425 N.E.2d at 36.
356 Id. This appellate court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had previously held
that there are “real and substantial differences between owners of a fee and a tenant
under a lease.” Id. The Illinois Supreme Court case that the Fiala court referenced dealt
with a tax issue. Id. The Fiala court made its own distinctions between single and mul-
tiple family residences as well. Id.
357 Id.
358 Fiala, 425 N.E.2d at 36. The Fiala court continued by finding that the defendant
did not “establish that the ordinance constitutes arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable
municipal action.” Id.
359 544 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Ga. 2001).
360 Id. at 154.
361 Id. at 155. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the judgment of conviction
against Foster. Id.
362 See e.g. Stephanie Doster, Kenner’s Pet Law Goes to the Dogs; Judge Strikes Down
Measure that Set Limit of 4 Pets Per House, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.) 1 (May
16, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 4009382) (discussing litigation over municipal ordi-
nance in Kenner, Louisiana). The attorney representing the defendant in the Kenner,
Louisiana case reported that the State Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court, finding for the City of Kenner. City of Kenner v. Kruebbe, 882 So.2d 596 (La.
2004). He has taken a writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court and has not yet heard back
on its decision. Voicemail from Anthony Ligi, Attorney, to Rebecca J. Huss, Assoc. Prof.
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and number of animals should make certain that the legislative record
articulates the link between a valid public policy, such as public
health, and the proposed limitation. Although occasionally a waiver to
a municipal ordinance is given, pet owners should be aware of the re-
strictions that may be placed on pet ownership prior to making a deci-
sion to reside in an area.363
B. Nuisance
The issue of nuisance is often raised when dealing with ani-
mals.364 There are different ways that nuisance is considered. Private
nuisance can be defined as “a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of
rights in land. The remedy for it lies in the hands of the individual
whose rights have been disturbed.”365 A tort action for damages arises
for a private nuisance so long as “the interference is substantial and
unreasonable, and such as would be offensive or inconvenient to the
normal person.”366
In contrast, a public nuisance (sometimes referred to as a common
nuisance) is “a species of catch-all criminal offenses consisting of an
interference with the rights of the community at large . . . . [T]he nor-
mal remedy is in the hands of the state.”367 A public nuisance may also
be a private nuisance if it interferes with the enjoyment of land.368 A
common scenario where the issue of private or public nuisance occurs
is when a property owner has dogs that bark.369 Following are a few
recent cases that illustrate the issues that are raised when dealing
with barking dogs.
The first case, Rae v. Flynn, illustrates how problems with bark-
ing dogs can escalate into allegations of violence.370 The dispute began
when Flynn complained that Rae’s dogs were barking and running at
of Law, Valparaiso U. Sch. of L. (Jan. 19, 2004, 11:10 a.m. CST) (transcription on file
with Author). See also Lizabeth Hall, Panel Considers Raising Limit on Pets; Proposals
Would Allow Residents to Keep More Than Three Per Home, Hartford Courant (Conn.)
B3 (Oct. 15, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 64211010) (discussing controversy over change
in policy).
363 See e.g. Jodi S. Cohen, Reprieve Granted in 2-Dog Limit Case, Chi. Trib. Metro 3
(Oct. 2, 2003) (available at 2003 WL 64666300) (discussing the suspension of a case
against a resident who brought home a third dog in violation of a municipal ordinance
restricting the number of dogs per household to two).
364 This nuisance discussion focuses on cases that relate to individual property own-
ers that are keeping companion animals. Nuisance issues relating to animals kept in
commercial kennels or kept for food production are beyond the scope of this article.
365 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 618 (5th ed., West 1984).
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Odor can also be an issue in nuisance cases. See Barnes v. Bd. of Adjustment of the
City of Bartlesville, 987 P.2d 430 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999) (potbellied pig case where odor
was an issue in determining whether keeping a pig was a nuisance); see also Boudinot v.
State, 340 P.2d 268, 271–72 (Okla. 1959) (affirming injunction that prohibited keeping a
large number of cats on residential property due to noise and odor).
370 690 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1997).
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large.371 Rae was found in violation of a municipal code ordinance for
“permitting an animal to be a nuisance or run at large.”372 Rae then
built a large dog kennel on the common property line.373 Flynn alleged
that the barking became worse and filed a complaint with local animal
control authorities.374 Both neighbors filed petitions for injunctions
against repeat violence with allegations of harassment and tres-
pass.375 Flynn’s petition was heard first, and at the conclusion of that
hearing, the parties stipulated to the entry of a permanent injunction
against violence.376 After a full evidentiary hearing on Rae’s petition,
the trial court denied the injunction and modified the previous injunc-
tion in favor of Flynn to “prohibit Rae from housing any pets outside
her property.”377 Rae appealed the decision of the trial court.378
The appellate court began with the premise that a “residential
property owner has a duty not to unreasonably interfere with other
persons’ use and enjoyment of their property.”379 It went on to state
that “mere noise may be so great at certain times and under certain
circumstances as to amount to an actionable nuisance.”380 Several de-
cisions by other courts have held that “excessive dog barking which
interferes with a neighboring property owner’s right to enjoy the use of
his or her home constitutes an enjoinable nuisance.”381
Unfortunately, as the Flynn court noted, there is no bright line
test to follow:
Although there is no exact rule or formula for ascertaining when barking
dogs rise to the level of nuisance, relief will be granted where plaintiffs
show they are substantially and unreasonably disturbed notwithstanding
proof that others living in the vicinity are not annoyed.382
The restrictions imposed on Rae were found to be within the au-
thority of the trial court, and the court admonished Rae for not having
“simply respected her neighbor’s legitimate complaint.”383
371 Id. at 1342. The number of dogs was not disclosed in the case.
372 Id.
373 Id. The kennel was ten feet by twenty feet. Id.
374 Id.
375 Flynn, 690 So. 2d at 1342.
376 Id.
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 Id. “Anything which annoys or disturbs one in the free use, possession, or enjoy-
ment of his property or which renders its ordinary use or occupation physically uncom-
fortable may become a nuisance and may be restrained.” Id. (quoting the Florida
Supreme Court in Knowles v. Central Allapattaw Properties, Inc., 145 Fla. 123, 130
(1940)).
380 Id. at 1342 n. 1 (quoting Florida Supreme Court in Bartlett v. Moats, 120 Fla. 61,
67 (1935) (quoting vice chancellor Pitney of New Jersey in Gilbough v. W. Side Amuse.
Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 27, 28 (1902)).
381 Flynn, 690 So. 2d at 1343.
382 Id.
383 Id. The court continued by stating “[n]eighbors should reasonably resolve their
differences without having to abuse the court system.” Id.
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Another dog barking case illustrates the type of evidence used to
support a complaint. In Zang v. Engle, the Zangs alleged the “Engles’
dogs engaged in excessive and continuous barking which constituted a
nuisance.”384 A magistrate found that a nuisance existed and ordered
that the “Engles be permanently enjoined from allowing any of their
dogs to bark in a manner that creates an unreasonable amount of noise
such that it interferes with the peace, quiet and normal enjoyment of
the Zangs’ residence.”385
Like Flynn, the Zang court set out general principles to determine
whether a private nuisance exists.
[I]t is not necessary that such owner be driven from his or her dwelling or
that the defendant’s acts create a positive unhealthy condition; it is enough
that the owner’s enjoyment of life and property is rendered uncomfortable
. . . . [A] trial court must look at what persons of ordinary taste and sensi-
bilities would regard as an inconvenience or interfere materially affecting
their physical comfort.386
The Zang court considered Mr. Zang’s testimony that he could
hear barking from inside his house even with the windows closed; and
that the barking had affected his ability to sleep and work out of his
home office, and had interrupted meals and entertaining.387 Ms. Zang
testified that the barking affected her ability to concentrate, her mood,
and interrupted her sleep.388 To support their testimony, the Zangs
kept a log of the dog barking, with entries made almost every day over
a year and four months.389 The Zangs also provided videotapes of the
dogs barking.390 Based on the record, the Zang court found that there
384 2000 WL 1341326 at *1 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Sept. 19, 2000). The Engles had four
dogs. Id. at *4.
385 Id. The Engles filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, but the trial court
overruled their objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. Id. One of the magis-
trate’s decisions that the trial court and this appellate court rejected was the request
that the Zangs submit to a psychological evaluation. Id. at *2. The Engles contended
that, because nuisance cases require a showing that the alleged nuisance annoys a per-
son of normal sensibilities, a psychological evaluation should have been ordered. Id. at
*3. The Zang court rejected this analysis and stated that “[s]imply because a nuisance
action may involve a showing that the plaintiff is a person of normal sensibilities does
not in and of itself serve as a basis for ordering a psychiatric or psychological evalua-
tion.” Zang, 2000 WL 1341326 at *3.
386 Id. at *4.
387 Id. at **4–5.
388 Id. at *5.
389 Id. “The logs as a whole show that the dogs were outside and barking at various
times.” Id.
390 Zang, 2000 WL 1341326 at *5. The videotapes were not on record on appeal. Id. at
*6. The Engles alleged that the Zangs provoked the dogs into barking, but the appellate
court found that the “trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the dogs were not
provoked into barking.” Id. at *7.
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was “sufficient competent, credible evidence to support a finding of a
private nuisance”391 and upheld the trial court’s injunction.392
Patterson v. City of Richmond illustrates a public nuisance involv-
ing barking dogs.393 Patterson appealed a bench trial verdict finding
she failed to “exercise proper care and control of her dogs to prevent
them from becoming a public nuisance” in violation of a Richmond city
code provision.394 The code provision at issue was a noise ordinance
that requires “that dog owners properly control their dogs to prevent
them from barking ‘in an excessive, continuous, or untimely fash-
ion.’”395 Patterson testified that she owned five dogs, two of which
were service animals.396 Two neighbors complained about the dogs
and testified about the negative impact the barking had on their
lives.397 The neighbors both testified that if they had known about the
barking they would not have bought their homes.398 An animal control
officer, who had previously issued notices to Patterson regarding the
barking of her dogs, issued the summons for violating the Richmond
code provision after a visit to Patterson’s house to investigate
complaints.399
Patterson argued that testimony from only two households was
insufficient to support a public nuisance violation.400 The appellate
court rejected this argument, finding that none of the relevant code
sections required a minimum number of people to be affected before
finding a violation.401 Citing to the Virginia Supreme Court, the court
found that, “if the annoyance is one that is common to the public gen-
erally, then it is a public nuisance. The test is not the number of per-
sons annoyed, but the possibility of annoyance to the public by the
invasion of its rights.”402 Therefore, Patterson’s conviction was
affirmed.403
391 Id.
392 Id. at *8. The trial court’s injunction also required the Engles to obtain an anti-
barking device for their dogs. Id.
393 576 S.E.2d 759 (Va. App. 2003).
394 Id. at 760.
395 Id. at 764.
396 Id. at 761. Patterson also testified that she occasionally provided housing for
other dogs through her work with the Central Virginia Doberman Rescue League. Id.
The court found that Patterson was legally blind and had “five to eight dogs at any one
time.” Id.
397 Patterson, 576 S.E.2d at 761. Similar to the testimony in Zang, Patterson’s neigh-
bors complained of loss of sleep, interference with entertainment and other normal ac-
tivities. Id.
398 Id. Both neighbors owned dogs themselves. Id.
399 Id. at 762. The animal control officer testified that she heard the dogs barking in a
manner that was “excessive, continuous,” and “untimely” given it was late in the eve-
ning. Id.
400 Patterson, 576 S.E.2d at 762. Patterson argued that a minimum of four persons
should testify to support a public nuisance. Id.
401 Id.
402 Id. at 763.
403 Id. at 765.
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In addition to cases involving barking dogs,404 there have been
claims of nuisance based on the trespass of dogs onto land,405 allowing
an animal to damage property,406 and threatening dogs.407 Needless to
say, there are a wide variety of claims of nuisance based on animals’
behavior and irresponsible owners.
C. The Popularity of Potbellied Pigs
As discussed above, municipal code provisions, subdivision cove-
nants, and zoning regulations often restrict the type of animals that
may be kept on real property. One survey estimated that the number
of “unusual” household pets is “nearly doubling every five years, [and
surpassed] two million in 2001.”408 One type of animal that is increas-
404 See e.g. Hernandez v. Richard, 772 So. 2d 994, 995 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000) (finding
violation of the municipal nuisance ordinance due to twelve to eighteen beagles where
issue was whether there was a frequent or continuous noise); City of Cuyahoga Falls v.
Vogel, 1998 WL 646766 at *3 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. Sept. 16, 1998) (upholding conviction
of nuisance ordinance for allowing a dog to bark and finding statute constitutional).
405 FOC Lawshe LP v. Intl. Paper Co., 574 S.E.2d 228, 230 (S.C. App. 2002) (discuss-
ing claim of nuisance based on disruption caused by trespassing dogs). A private nui-
sance claim has also been supported by the failure to contain dogs. Wallace v. Grasso,
119 S.W.3d 567, 580–81 (Mo. App. 2003).
406 Savage v. State, 587 S.E.2d 294, 297–98 (Ga. App. 2003) (upholding conviction for
violation of public nuisance law when owner’s dogs damaged the property of others).
407 Williams v. King, 860 So. 2d 847, 851–52 (Miss. App. 2003) (finding that evidence
supported a claim of private nuisance when a dog was threatening to others).
408 Sean L. McCarthy, Exotic Pets’ Popularity Brings Trouble; Rare Diseases, Care
Raise Concern, Ariz. Republic (Phoenix) A1 (July 21, 2003) (available at 2003 WL
57919049) (citing to survey by the American Veterinary Medical Association). This arti-
cle continues by discussing pets as fads and states that “fads have come and gone for the
ostrich and the potbellied pig, and now people are hyping miniature horses.” Id. See
infra pt. IV(D) (discussing case involving a miniature horse). Maintaining a standard
size horse on residential property may also violate local laws. See e.g. Wing v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Cromwell, 767 A.2d 131, 136–37 (Conn. App. 2001) (hold-
ing that the evidence did not establish a legal nonconforming use of a pony or horse on
property); Town of Atlantic Beach v. Young, 298 S.E.2d 686, 691–92 (N.C. 1983) (hold-
ing that ordinance prohibiting keeping of livestock within town limits was not unconsti-
tutional with respect to keeping of a pony and goats); State v. Willett, 1995 WL 815497
at *2 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. Dec. 29, 1995) (affirming judgment of the trial court that
Willett created a public nuisance by failing to properly contain a horse within three
acres of land). Keeping chickens in cities is also an issue that causes disputes. See e.g.
City of St. Paul v. Nelson, 404 N.W.2d 890, 891 (Minn. App. 1987) (discussing case of a
denial of a permit to keep a rooster in St. Paul, Minnesota); Nancy Woods, Afowl of the
Law, Oregonian 01 (Jan. 8, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 58851887) (discussing a ban on
chickens in one Oregon city and the Portland ordinance that allows residents to keep up
to three chickens without getting a permit). People keeping chickens may not view them
as companion animals, but as a source of food. See e.g. Katy Skinner, The City Chicken,
http://www.thecitychicken.com (accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (discussing various aspects of
raising chickens in cities). A 1986 Illinois appellate court case found that a monkey that
was registered as an endangered species would fall within the definition of “domesti-
cated household pet.” City of Rolling Meadows v. Kyle, 494 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ill. App. 1st
Dist. 1986).
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ingly becoming the subject of disputes is the potbellied pig.409
Thousands of these animals were sold to U.S. households in the early
and mid-1990s.410 As the pigs grew larger than anticipated, many
owners sought to “rehome” them, and most pig sanctuaries are now at
capacity.411 Another reaction to the increasing size of the animals is
that they are being kept outside—in full view of the neighbors. It is
common that claims of nuisance and other code violations are raised
when potbellied pigs are kept as companion animals.412 Two cases,
Barnes v. Board of Adjustment of the City of Bartlesville413 and
Gebauer v. Lake Forest Property Owners Assn., Inc.,414 will be de-
scribed herein to illustrate some of the issues involving potbellied
pigs.415
In Barnes, the owner of a 220 pound potbellied pig named Porsche
applied for a special zoning permit after a new ordinance was passed
that provided “[n]o outdoor quadrupeds or bipeds, except dogs and
cats, shall be kept without prior approval of the Board of Adjust-
ment.”416 The Board of Adjustment (Board) denied the adjustment and
the district court upheld the denial.417 The basis for the denial was
that the Board, pursuant to zoning regulations, shall not grant a spe-
cial zoning permit unless the use would not constitute a nuisance,
among other requirements.418 There had been testimony at the zoning
409 See generally Andrea Hart Herbster, More Than Pigs in a Parlor: An Exploration
of the Relationship between the Law and Keeping Pigs as Pets, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 339
(2000) (discussing legal issues that arise when pigs are kept as companion animals).
410 Jessica Wanke, In More Ways than One, Pigs Got Too Big; Abundance, Size Ended
Potbelly Fad, Ariz. Republic (Phoenix) B2 (July 23, 2003) (available at 2003 WL
57919559) (citing to an estimate by Jane Treser of the National Committee on Potbel-
lied Pigs).
411 Id.
412 See e.g. Kusznir v. Zoning Bd. of Apps. of the City of Shelton, 759 A.2d 1036, 1038
(Conn. App. 2000) (upholding a cease and desist order prohibiting a property owner
from keeping two potbellied pigs on property in violation of a zoning regulation that
prohibits keeping livestock on lots smaller than two acres); City of Lilburn v. Sanchez,
491 S.E.2d 353, 355–57 (Ga. 1997) (utilizing the rational basis test to find that a city
ordinance that prohibited the keeping of potbellied pigs on lots under one acre in size
was constitutional); City of Peoria v. Ohl, 636 N.E.2d 1029, 1030 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1994)
(upholding ruling that zoning ordinance prohibiting farm animals did not preclude
property owner from keeping potbellied pig within a residential zone); Malmgren v. In-
verness Forest Residents Civic Club, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 875, 880 (Tex. App. 1st Dist. 1998)
(granting property owners motion for summary judgment on a statute of limitations
defense in case about a potbellied pig).
413 987 P.2d 430 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999).
414 723 So. 2d 1288 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
415 See generally Herbster, supra n. 409 (discussing other cases involving potbellied
pigs). Cases involving potbellied pigs continue to be generated. See e.g. Association Says
Pigs Must Go, Orlando Sentinel (Fla.) B3 (Nov. 22, 2003) (discussing local homeowners
association ruling against homeowner with two potbellied pigs in Winter Garden, Flor-
ida); Dateline Texas, Houston Chron. 37 (Sept. 14, 2003) (discussing dispute over a
swine ordinance in Wink, Texas).
416 987 P.2d at 431.
417 Id.
418 Id. at 432.
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hearing that since Porsche had been in residence there had been more
flies and odor.419 The only governmental official that visited the prop-
erty was the Chief Building Inspector, a Code Enforcement Officer who
testified that he saw Porsche and could detect an unpleasant odor.420
Porsche’s veterinarian testified that he did not believe there is any
more odor attributable to a Vietnamese pot-bellied pig than to any
other animal, and Porsche’s owner, Barnes, testified that Porsche had
no offensive odor.421 The appellate court acknowledged that the evi-
dence (of the odor) was disputed, but found there was sufficient evi-
dence supporting the denial of Barnes’ application.422 A second
argument, that the new ordinance violated state law because it lacked
a grandfather clause, was also rejected since there was testimony that
pigs were considered farm animals and, prior to the amendment, were
not permitted to be kept within the city limits.423
A different result was reached in Gebauer.424 The judge in this
case utilized several swine related metaphors,425 and found that the
evidence did not support a finding that keeping a potbellied pig vio-
lated a neighborhood’s restrictive covenant or that the potbellied pig
created a nuisance.426 The neighborhood restrictive covenant stated:
No livestock of any description may be kept or permitted on the property
with the exception of dogs, cats, and other animals which are qualified
household pets, and which do not make objectionable noise or constitute a
nuisance or inconvenience to owners of other lots nearby.427
Although this restrictive covenant was not as specific as the cove-
nant in Barnes, the real distinction is how the judge viewed the partic-
ular animal.428 In Gebauer, the court spent a significant amount of
time discussing the distinction between potbellied pigs and pigs that
are used for human consumption.429 A “Day in the Life of Taylor”
videotape was submitted as evidence that showed the activities of the
potbellied pig.430 The Gebauer court found that the evidence presented
in the case did not support a finding that Taylor was livestock.431 Re-
gardless of the fact that potbellied pigs are genetically swine, the court
found the evidence supported that the pig in this case was a household
419 Id.
420 Id. at 433.
421 Id. at 432–33.
422 Barnes, 987 P.2d at 433.
423 Id.
424 723 So. 2d at 1290.
425 Id. at 1288–89 (e.g., “review committee charged ahead like a wild boar in rutting
season,” “with the exception of an oink, oink here and an oink, oink there, Taylor is
quiet,” and “the property owners association gleefully wallows in that statement”).
426 Gebauer, 723 So. 2d at 1290.
427 Id.
428 Barnes, 987 P.2d at 432.
429 Gebauer, 723 So. 2d at 1289–90.
430 Id. at 1289. This pig apparently sleeps indoors at night. Id.
431 Id. at 1290.
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pet.432 As to the trial court’s finding that Taylor was a nuisance, the
Gebauer court found there was no evidence supporting that conclusion,
stating “[t]here is no suggestion in the records that Taylor is loud, that
she strays from her fenced-in yard, that she smells, or that she has any
other unpleasantness about her.”433
These potbellied pig cases illustrate the difficulty that municipali-
ties and subdivisions have in enabling persons to keep companion ani-
mals on their property without allowing a nuisance to remain
unabated. Given the popularity of these animals, a logical approach is
to focus on the impact of the animal on surrounding property holders—
whether there is unreasonable noise or odor rather than the type of
animal that is being kept.
D. When is a Horse Not Just a Horse?
As discussed above, in addition to specific types of animals barred
from municipalities, there are cases where animals are purportedly
acting as service animals and thus should be exempt from municipal
ordinances.434 There are also cases that focus on the validity of munici-
pal ordinances restricting particular animals that also raise quasi-ser-
vice animal issues. The case of Ridgewood Homeowners Assn. v.
Mignacca provides an example of the complexity of such cases.435
Mignacca dealt with a family that wanted to keep a miniature horse in
an “upscale and lavish” subdivision.436 The Mignaccas’ son, Christian,
had weakened legs that required the use of braces frequently due to a
bout of bacterial meningitis.437 His weakened limbs precluded Chris-
432 Id. at 1289–90.
433 Id. at 1290. The neighborhood association’s case was not improved by evidence
that another potbellied pig lived in the neighborhood and no action was taken against
that property owner, or that there was no evidence that any of the three members of the
architectural review committee had ever seen the pig. Id. at 1289.
434 Recently a court found that a town did not discriminate against a young woman
(Tiffany) in violation of the ADA when it refused to provide a modification to its munici-
pal ordinance to allow a miniature horse to be kept within city limits. Access Now, Inc.
v. Town of Jasper, 268 F. Supp. 2d 973, 973 (E.D. Tenn. 2003). In Town of Jasper, the
court found that: “(1) Tiffany [was] not disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the
horse [was] not a service animal; (3) Tiffany [did] not need to use the horse as a service
animal; and (4) the Town [had] not discriminate[d] against Tiffany by reason of disabil-
ity.” Id. at 974. Tiffany suffered from a form of spina bifida known as cervical my-
elomenigocele and hydrocephalus (water on the brain) and had a history of grand mal
seizures. Id. Evidence supporting the Town of Jasper’s position included Tiffany’s doc-
tor’s statement that Tiffany does not need a service animal and other evidence proving
that Tiffany was not substantially limited in her standing and walking. Id. at 975, 977.
The court specifically stated that the issue of whether the horse was a service animal
“does not turn on the type and amount of training” but on whether the horse was a
service animal under the ADA. Id. at 980. Because the horse did “not assist and perform
tasks for the benefit of Tiffany to help her overcome or deal with an ADA disability,” it
was not a service animal. Id.
435 2001 WL 873004 (R.I. Super. July 13, 2001), rev’d, 813 A.2d 965 (R.I. 2003).
436 Id. at *4 (describing the Ridgewood subdivision and stating it was a “verdant and
secluded enclave for some members of Rhode Island’s economic aristocracy.”).
437 Id. at *2.
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tian’s participation in competitive sports such as basketball, soccer,
and football; and he participated in shows and competitive events with
the horse.438 The Rhode Island Superior Court (the lower court) took
judicial notice of “the emotional and physical well being animals kept
as pets often bring to their human companions.”439 The superior court
found Christian’s physical and psychological challenges relevant, but
stated that the relevant municipal ordinances and Rhode Island law
regarding restrictive covenants and equity were of paramount
concern.440
The restrictive covenant at the core of this case441 provided in
part, “no animals, livestock or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred,
or kept on any lot, except that two (2) dogs and/or two cats may be
kept . . . .”442 Definitions of “livestock” and “pet” in Rhode Island law
both included a reference to equines.443 The lower court conducted a
view to determine the circumstances in which the horse was
housed.444 There were comparisons in the lower court’s opinion of the
miniature horse’s size and level of noise (whinny) to those of a dog that
found that the horse was smaller and likely to make less noise than a
canine.445
The superior court’s interpretation of the restrictive covenant, us-
ing general principles of statutory construction, was that the covenant
was ambiguous as to scope and the intent was to prevent residents of
the community from “keeping and raising animals in a ‘farm-like’ set-
ting for commercial purposes.”446 In addition to the ambiguities in the
covenant, the superior court found that the particular covenants at is-
sue had been enforced arbitrarily, or not at all.447 Ultimately, the su-
perior court found that the restrictive covenant would not apply to the
miniature horse in this case.448
438 Id.
439 Id. at *4. The court footnoted this statement with the following: “A number of
scientific studies have confirmed what any casual observer of pets interacting with
humans should know.” Id. at *4 n. 2.
440 Mignacca, 2001 WL 873004 at *5.
441 There was also a zoning issue in this case that related to a city code provision that
allowed for horses to be kept in different sections of the city if the property contained a
minimum amount of acreage. Id. The superior court agreed with the Mignaccas’ inter-
pretation of this zoning issue, allowing the horse to be kept on their four acre property.
Id. at *6. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed this portion of the opinion as
well, finding that the Superior Court Justice exceeded his authority in reviewing the
Zoning Board of Review’s decision. Ridgewood Homeowners Assoc. v. Mignacca, 813
A.2d 965, 976–77 (R.I. 2003).
442 Mignacca, 2001 WL 873004 at *6.
443 Id. at **6–7 (citing to R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 4-13-1.2(5), 4-13-1.1(8) (2001)).
444 Id. at *4.
445 Id. at **2, 10.
446 Mignacca, 2001 WL 873004 at **7–8.
447 Id. at *9.
448 Id. at *11. In addition to the restrictive covenant relating to horses, this case also
considered a restrictive covenant relating to the shed in which the horse was housed. Id.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed the judg-
ment of the superior court on the restrictive covenant action.449 The
decision referenced the “therapeutic” reasons for the purchase of the
horse, but did not compare the horse to other domesticated animals
nor reference the role that the horse played in the life of Christian.450
The restrictive covenant was not ambiguous and had not been enforced
arbitrarily.451 The Superior Court was directed to enter a judgment
“permanently enjoining the Mignaccas from keeping the miniature
horse on their property.”452
This case illustrates some recognition of the role that animals can
play in the lives of their human companions. Although both courts uti-
lized general principals of statutory construction, the role of animals in
the lives of their human caretakers was a factor in finding for the
Mignaccas, as indicated by the emphasis in the Superior Court’s opin-
ion on the specific circumstances of the relationship between this mini-
ature horse and Christian.453 Conversely, the Supreme Court virtually
ignored the role of the horse in Christian’s life in its finding the restric-
tive covenant valid.454 What is clear, based on the FHA, is that if
Christian was disabled, and the horse was a service animal, the analy-
sis would be whether a reasonable accommodation would need to be
made to the restrictive covenant rather than considering the language
of the covenant itself.
This section illustrates the broad power of local governments to
regulate the presence of animals on private property. If an ordinance is
properly drafted, it is likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. If animal
owners wish to have more flexibility in the number or type of animals
that they want to harbor, it will be necessary to utilize the local or
state legislative system to make such a change.
E. The “Bite Issue”
There are significant issues raised by keeping companion animals
in urban areas. This article has focused on the problems that animal
owners have obtaining and retaining housing. These issues presume
that the persons wanting the animals in their lives are responsible
owners and their pets do not fall within the definition of a dangerous
animal. Unfortunately, many people are not responsible for their com-
panion animals, and this causes significant problems. Issues relating
to welfare of abused and abandoned animals are beyond the scope of
this paper, but are all obviously of great concern to urban planners.
449 Mignacca, 813 A.2d at 968.
450 Id. The Supreme Court briefly referenced the view that occurred in connection
with the Superior Court case. Id. at 970.
451 Id. at 971–72.
452 Id. at 977.
453 Mignacca, 2001 WL 873004 at **2, 4. The superior court also considered the equi-
ties of the case. Id. at **10–11.
454 Mignacca, 813 A.2d at 969, 977.
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Another issue that is beyond the scope of this paper is the signifi-
cant problem of companion animals causing injury to people.455 In the
housing context, it is obviously a concern to landlords that they could
be held liable for an action of an animal being harbored by one of their
tenants. The most recent published statistic is that there were 4.7 mil-
lion dog bite incidents in the U.S. in 1999.456 One estimate is that the
number of dog bite victims who require medical attention in the U.S.
ranges from five hundred thousand to one million annually.457 It is
estimated that seventy percent of the incidents occur on the dog own-
ers’ property and that half of all children will be bitten by age
twelve.458
Under most state laws, if a person’s dog bites someone, the owner
will be responsible for expenses and damages.459 According to the In-
surance Information Institute (I.I.I.), “[d]og bites now account for one-
third of all homeowner’s insurance liability claims, costing roughly
$310 million . . . .”460 The I.I.I. reports that “homeowners and renters
insurance policies typically cover dog bite liability.”461 One problem is
that some insurance companies are now refusing to insure households
that contain certain breeds, regardless of that particular animal’s his-
tory; and if a dog bites someone, it may be difficult for the owner to find
455 See generally Am. Veterinary Med. Assn. Task Force on Canine Aggression &
Human-Canine Interactions, A Community Approach to Dog Bite Prevention, 218 J.
Am. Veterinary Med. Assn. 1732 (AVMA 2001) (available at http://www.avma.org/
pubhlth/dogbite/dogbite.pdf (accessed Nov. 4, 2004)) (setting forth the problem and ap-
proaches to preventing dog bites in communities); Beck & Katcher, supra n. 8, at
206–26 (discussing the problem of dog bites).
456 Ins. Info. Inst., Dog Bite Liability, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/
dogbite/content.print (March 2004); see also Am. Veterinary Med. Assn. (AVMA), CDC
Release Epidemiologic Survey of Dog Bites in 2001, http://www.avma.org/onlnews/
javma/sep03/030915i.asp (Sept. 15, 2003). One difficulty in determining the extent of
this problem is that no centralized reporting system for dog bites exists. Id.
457 Am. Veterinary Med. Assn. (AVMA), Don’t Worry, They Won’t Bite, http://
www.avma.org/pubhlth/dogbite/dogbitebroc.asp (Apr. 28, 2004) “Children make up
more than 60 percent of all dog bite victims.” Id. at “Who’s Being Bitten?”
458 E-mail from Alejandra Soto, Ins. Info. Inst., to Rebecca J. Huss, Prof. of L., Valpa-
raiso U. Sch. L. (Feb. 10, 2004, 12:26 p.m. CST) (on file with Author).
459 Ins. Info. Inst., Who Let the Dogs Out? – Avoid Being Bitten With a Lawsuit,
Warns I.I.I., http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.622080_content.print/ (May 6,
2002).
460 Id.
461 Id. Of course if the claim exceeds the limit of the holder’s policy, the insured will
be personally responsible for excess. Id.
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insurance.462 If a dog owner is a tenant, it is common that a landlord
will also be sued for damages.463
At common law, owners (or keepers) of animals that did not know
or have reason to know of the vicious propensity of an animal would
not be liable unless they were negligent.464 Some states have changed
this common law rule by adopting statutory language that provides for
strict liability for injuries caused by dogs.465 Liability for landlords is
often predicated on their ability to control the situation.466 Obviously
landlords have less control over what happens within the unit itself
than over common areas.467 Some states’ case law establishes that
landlords are not liable for the actions of dogs belonging to their te-
nants, even in cases where the landlord knew the danger of a foresee-
able harm.468 It may be necessary to show that the landlord had both
462 Ins. Info. Inst., supra n. 456; see also Karyn Grey, Breed-Specific Legislation Re-
visited: Canine Racism or the Answer to Florida’s Dog Control Problems? 17 Nova L.
Rev. 415, 419–21 (2003) (discussing insurance issues relating to dangerous dogs); Har-
old W. Hannah, Survey of Illinois Law: Liability for Animal Inflicted Injury, 24 S. Ill. U.
L.J. 693, 694 (2000) (discussing Illinois law relating to dog bites); Brian Sodergren, In-
surance Companies Unfairly Target Specific Dog Breeds, http://www.hsus.org/ace/18624
(accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (discussing insurance issues related to ownership of large,
powerful dogs).
463 Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 129–30, 162.
464 Soave, supra n. 18, at 165; see also Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 126–27.
This common law scheme is the genesis of the (now incorrect in many jurisdictions)
belief by many animal owners that there is a “one-bite free” rule. Soave, supra n. 18, at
165.
465 Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 141–44; see e.g. Fla Stat. Ann. § 767.04 (West
2004) (stating that the “owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on
or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the
owner of the dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of the
former viciousness of the dog or the owners’ knowledge of such viciousness”); see also
Anna Sibylle Ehresmann, Torts: Smith v. Ruduiso: Tightening the Leash on New Mex-
ico’s Dogs, 32 N.M. L. Rev. 335, 339–40 (2002) (discussing the evolution of New Mexico’s
law on dog bite liability).
466 Ramona C. Rains, Clemmons v. Fidler: Is Man’s Best Friend a Landlord’s Worst
Enemy? 19 Am. J. Tr. Advoc. 197, 200 (1995) (discussing the rationales that courts util-
ize when considering whether landlords should be held liable for the actions of a ten-
ant’s animal).
467 Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 162 (analyzing landlord cases using the physi-
cal location where the injury occurred).
468 Fair v. U.S., 513 S.E.2d 616, 617 (S.C. 1999) (holding that a landlord is not liable
to a tenant’s invitee for harm caused by the tenant’s dog); Mitchell v. Bazzle, 404 S.E.2d
910, 911–12 (S.C. App. 1991) (finding that even though the landlord knew of the dog’s
viciousness, had adequate time to terminate the tenant’s lease, and failed to terminate
the tenant’s lease, the landlord was not liable for the acts of the tenant’s dog over which
the landlord had no control). A 1996 Iowa Supreme Court case found that a landlord
who does not have any right to control a tenant’s dog would not be liable to an invitee of
a tenant. Allison v. Page, 545 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Iowa 1996). The Iowa Supreme Court
began its analysis by citing to the general rule that “a landlord is not liable for injuries
caused by the unsafe condition of the property arising after it is leased, provided there
is no agreement to repair” subject to several exceptions. Id. Those exceptions include if
a landlord retains control of the property and will retain liability for unsafe conditions
and defects in areas available to the public. Id. The common principle is that liability is
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control of the premises as well as knowledge of the vicious propensities
of the dog in order to find liability.469 Normally, landlords are not lia-
ble for injuries caused by a tenant’s animal that occur off a landlord’s
premises, but there are cases to the contrary.470 Landlords may ulti-
mately prevail in cases where they do not have knowledge or control;
however, the mere fact that they are likely to be sued encourages the
imposition of a no-pets policy.
In order to reduce the impact of tort lawsuits based on the actions
of tenants’ animals on innocent landlords, state statutes should clarify
the circumstances under which landlords should be held liable for inju-
ries caused by animals. Certainly if the landlord has actual knowledge
of a dangerous animal and is able to remove the threat, it is reasonable
to expect a landlord to do so. However, it is often difficult for a landlord
(or even an owner) to determine which animals may cause a threat to
people, and the responsibility for the animals should ultimately re-
main on the owner.
premised upon control. Id. This rule would apply even though the landlord in this case
knew or had reason to know that the dog was dangerous. Id. at 282. Note that a later
Supreme Court of Iowa case dealt with the issue of “whether a landlord has a duty to
keep common areas reasonably safe by excluding a dog with known vicious propensi-
ties.” Fouts v. Mason, 592 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Iowa 1999). Fouts was remanded for further
proceedings based on the facts that indicated that the landlord knew or had reason to
know that a dog posed a danger to people in a common backyard and had a “duty to
protect those lawfully in the common area.” Id. at 40. See also Smaxwell v. Bayard, 682
N.W.2d 923, 942 (Wis. 2004) (holding that “common law liability of landowners and
landlords for negligence associated with injuries caused by dogs is limited to situations
where the landowner or landlord is also the owner or keeper of the dog causing injury”).
469 Twogood v. Wentz, 634 N.W.2d 514, 520 (N.D. 2001). The North Dakota Supreme
Court has stated “a duty to protect others from harm by an animal on the premises
arises only when the landlord knows that the animal is dangerous and presents an
unreasonable risk of harm.” Amoytte v. Rolette Co. Hous. Auth., 658 N.W.2d 324, 328
(N.D. 2003). In Amoyotte, a minor tenant was clawed by a stray cat while she was play-
ing outside the complex. Id. at 325. But see Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d
945, 948 (Alaska 1986) (finding that a mobile home park had a duty to exercise reasona-
ble care to enforce its rules and regulations regarding vicious dogs and could be held
liable after a pit bull of one tenant attacked another tenant). Smalley has been distin-
guished by cases from other jurisdictions, including Amoyotte. Amoyotte, 658 N.W.2d at
328; see also Matthews v. Amberwood Assocs. LP, 719 A.2d 119, 131–32 (Md. 1998) (stat-
ing in a case where a tenant’s invitee was mauled “we do not suggest that a landlord is
responsible for most negligent conditions in leased apartments including conditions cov-
ered by provisions in a lease. . . . however, where a landlord retained control over the
matter of animals in the tenant’s apartment, coupled with the knowledge of past vicious
behavior by the animal, the extremely dangerous nature of pit bull dogs, and the fore-
seeability of harm to persons and property in the apartment complex, the jury was justi-
fied in finding that the landlord had a duty to the plaintiffs and that the duty was
breached”). Matthews had an extensive dissent and has been criticized as unnecessarily
broadening and clouding a landlord’s duty to police a tenant’s actions within a premise,
and as providing a disincentive for including “no-pets” provisions in leases. Wade B.
Wilson, The Maryland Survey: 1998-1999: Recent Decisions: The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, 59 Md. L. Rev. 1254, 1254 (2000).
470 Favre & Borchelt, supra n. 315, at 163.
128 ANIMAL LAW [Vol. 11:69
V. CONCLUSION
The focus of this article has been on the impact of including ani-
mals in the lives of humans. It is also important to consider the well-
being of the animals. Despite the best efforts of humane societies and
other charitable organizations, an overwhelming number of companion
animals are euthanized each year.471 Continued efforts to educate pet
owners about the benefits of spaying and neutering, and of the provi-
sion of affordable veterinary services, are essential in combating this
problem. Providing for additional housing options can also play a role
in preventing the euthanasia of animals that are otherwise adoptable.
An issue raised by one author is whether it is a reasonable expec-
tation to require animals to act as the primary emotional support for
their human companions.472 Pet owners clearly appreciate the benefits
of having these animals in their lives—but animals’ interest in having
a positive and safe environment should also be considered.
Pet ownership can be facilitated by improved housing design.473
Attention to a dog or cat’s environment can reduce behavioral
problems as well as improve a pet’s quality of life.474 Proper fencing
and windows that allow for a view provide enrichment while keeping a
pet secure.475
Clear guidelines on the proper disposal of excrement and/or suffi-
cient disposal units can help eliminate the potential health problems
associated with this waste, especially in urban areas.476 Setting aside
471 The Humane Society of the United States estimates that three to four million
animals are euthanized by shelters each year. The Humane Socy. of the U.S., Common
Questions about Animal Shelters and Animal Control, “How Many Animals Enter Shel-
ters Each Year? And How Many Are Euthanized?” http://www.hsus.org/ace/20231#3
(accessed Mar. 12, 2005).
472 See generally Jon Katz, The New Work of Dogs Tending to Life, Love and Family,
(Villard Books 2003). Mr. Katz provides a view of several relationships between humans
and dogs over a year-long period in the author’s town of Montclair, New Jersey. Id. at
xxi. Among other issues, Mr. Katz considers the appropriateness of the role of dogs as
an emotional support system. Id. at 14–26. Mr. Katz’s work includes several instances
where a dog was not properly socialized or trained, and thus, the relationship between
the owner and dog was poor, or the dog was eventually surrendered. Id. at 196, 199,
204–05.
473 Virginia Sarah Sandford Jackson, BTRP (Hons), Facilitating Pet Ownership
through Improved Housing Design, 209 JAVMA 1076 (Sept. 15, 1996). Although the re-
port is based on an Australian study, most of the recommendations are directly applica-
ble to housing issues in the U.S. Id. at 1076.
474 Id. at 1077; see also Trey Clark, Pet Happy Housing, Desert Sun (Palm Springs,
Cal.) F1 (Aug. 10, 2003) (available at 2003 WL55977749) (discussing ways to improve
the quality of life for animals that live in condominiums or apartments).
475 Jackson, supra n. 473, at 1077–78.
476 An example of setting aside sanitary spaces for the use of dogs is the city of Paris.
Delta Socy., Dogs in Paris, http://www.deltasociety.org/dsz205.htm (accessed Mar. 12,
2005). Paris installed spaces along a boulevard and in public gardens covered with
materials dogs liked and installed signs to direct owners in the use of them. Id. Report-
edly the areas that have the sanitary spaces stay clean. Id. The City of Rennes in
France also installed dog toilets and dog areas in the city center as part of ongoing
2005] NO PETS ALLOWED 129
park areas specifically for the use of dogs is one way to provide a posi-
tive experience for animals as well as to encourage the responsible con-
trol over animals.477 Educating people about their responsibilities as
owners of an animal will also be key to successfully integrating ani-
mals into housing.478
Some of these issues must be supported by an increased demand
by pet owners, such as requesting housing that considers the needs of
animals. Other issues can be dealt with at the appropriate governmen-
tal level. Some cities and states have been proactive in developing
projects that allow for companion animals to be part of the lives of
humans.479 Pet owners should exercise their right to vote for public
officials that consider issues relating to companion animals as an im-
portant priority of their jobs.480 By balancing the valid interests in
public safety and the benefits of being able to include companion ani-
mals in the lives of those who desire this relationship, it will be possi-
ble to change laws to support responsible pet ownership.
urban planning. Delta Socy., Integrating Animals into the Community, http://
www.deltasociety.org/dsz201.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005).
477 Huss, Separation, supra n. 2, at 184–85 (discussing dog parks). Many times com-
munity groups that advocate for responsible pet ownership instigate the setting aside of
park land for use as a dog park. Id.; see also Delta Socy., Park Liebrecht: Green Space
Designed for City People and Pets, http://www.deltasociety.org/dsz209.htm (accessed
Mar. 12, 2005) (discussing the planning of an urban green space that took the interests
of several constituencies into account including dog owners).
478 Delta Socy., Good Dog Campaign and Poop Scoop Scheme, http://
www.deltasociety.org/dsz210.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005) (reporting on the actions in
Warwickshire, England, that include a major health education initiative encouraging
responsible dog ownership and materials that encouraged the proper disposal of dog
waste); Delta Socy., The Responsible Pet Ownership Neighborhood Program, http://
www.deltasociety.org/dsz208.htm (accessed Nov. 4, 2004) (discussing a program imple-
mented successfully in Tallahassee, Florida designed to improve the behavior of com-
panion animal owners).
479 Delta Socy., AFIRAC: Towards Better Integration of Animals in the City, http://
www.deltasociety.org/dsz202.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005). The French Association on
Human and Animal Interaction (AFIRAC) has assisted at least sixty municipalities in
France in developing projects that are intended to improve “the quality of urban life
through a harmonious integration of pets in cities . . . .” Id.
480 An example of an animal-conscious official would be Congressman Earl
Blumenauer (U.S. Representative for the State of Oregon) who stated that “a livable
community promotes the humane treatment of animals” and that “animals enrich our
lives on a daily basis.” Earl Blumenauer, The Role of Animals in Livable Communities,
7 Animal L. i, ii (2001). AIFRAC offers several recommendations to ensure the success
of programs designed to integrate animals in cities including consideration of a variety
of interests, education and training of dog owners and city officials, and follow up. Delta
Socy., Success Factors of Programs that Integrate Animals in Cities, http://
www.deltasociety.org/dsz203.htm (accessed Mar. 12, 2005).

